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There is a blind spot in the scholarly and legal treatment of housing 
discrimination: the racial biases of homeseekers. Search strategies routinely 
incorporate information about neighborhood racial composition, either as a 
proxy or as a direct preference. Although search heuristics can powerfully 
entrench and perpetuate (or, alternatively, disrupt) segregation, it is widely 
assumed that the way families search for homes is none of the law’s business. 
This Article questions that assumption and, more broadly, examines how 
homeseeking fits into a societal conception of fair housing that assigns positive 
value to integration. 
INTRODUCTION 
Private discrimination against homeseekers based on race has been illegal in 
the United States since 1968.1 But discrimination on the part of homeseekers 
has received no parallel regulatory or legislative attention.2 Rather, it is 
generally assumed that a househunter has every legal right to enter or avoid a 
community for any reason she likes, including its racial or ethnic composition.3 
 
1 Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) in 1968. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 
(2012)). A 1968 Supreme Court decision also recognized that § 1982 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 bans both public and private racial discrimination in property transactions. Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). The FHA currently reaches discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, familial status, and disability, see, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 3604(a), but race will be my focus here.  
2 I argue that certain forms of discriminatory homeseeking could in fact be reached 
through existing law. See infra Part III. But the prevailing view of the law’s coverage is very 
much to the contrary. 
3 See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share 
Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1579 (1993) (explaining that 
efforts at integration would be thwarted, even if illegal conduct were addressed, by whites’ 
“perfectly legal housing choices that, cumulatively, would lead to segregated 
neighborhoods”); Xavier de Souza Briggs, Politics and Policy: Changing the Geography of 
Opportunity, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY 310, 314-15 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 
2005) (“[S]egregation stems not only from illegal acts of discrimination but also from 
perfectly legal, if segregative, choices,” including “‘self-steering’ by whites and 
minorities”); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
967, 987 (2012) (describing as “perfectly legal” the diminution in housing choice that comes 
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On the surface, this asymmetry fits neatly with antidiscrimination law’s focus 
on unblocking access to housing opportunities.4 Yet as Thomas Schelling’s 
work made clear decades ago, individual location choices can have a profound, 
cumulative impact on overall housing patterns and hence on available housing 
choices.5 And the role that neighborhood racial composition continues to play 
in the home selection decisions of white households, whether as a proxy or as a 
direct preference,6 remains a chief driver of segregation.7 
It is, therefore, something of a puzzle why antidiscrimination law, and legal 
scholarship devoted to the topic, have largely ignored homeseeking.8 The 
puzzle deepens when we consider the integrative goal of the Fair Housing Act 
(“FHA”)9—a goal that would seem to require either addressing segregative 
 
“in the form of a majority-group member’s consumer choice to opt out of inclusion”).  
4 See Seicshnaydre, supra note 3, at 981 (“[T]he FHA protects the choices of the housing 
consumer in a marketplace in which the housing provider stands as gatekeeper.”). 
5 E.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 147-66 (1978); see 
also DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM 93-120 (2014). 
6 See INGRID GOULD ELLEN, SHARING AMERICA’S NEIGHBORHOODS 49 (2000) (discussing 
whites’ use of “race as a proxy”); infra Section I.A.2.  
7 See, e.g., Lance Freeman & Tiancheng Cai, White Entry into Black Neighborhoods: 
Advent of a New Era?, 660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 302, 302 (2015) (“While 
there is considerable debate about the causes of the spatial isolation of blacks, on one reason 
there is near unanimity—whites’ avoidance of black neighborhoods.”). 
8 The most detailed legal analysis of the issue of which I am aware is Seicshnaydre, 
supra note 3, at 998-1003. Most analysts ignore the issue as both a doctrinal and theoretical 
matter. See, e.g., TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 200 (2015) 
(noting antidiscrimination law’s asymmetrical application to some actors and not others and 
expressing surprise “that most discrimination law theorists ignore this ostensibly bizarre set-
up”). Scholars in other disciplines have explored the dynamics of housing search and choice 
in considerable detail but have not focused on regulating homeseeking. See infra Section 
I.A. A growing literature has begun to address other discriminatory consumer choices. See, 
e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
223 (2016); Michael Blake, The Discriminating Shopper, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1017 
(2006); Kimani Paul-Emile, Patients’ Racial Preferences and the Medical Culture of 
Accommodation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 462 (2012); Saul Levmore, Title VII to Tinder: Law’s 
Asymmetry and (Occasional) Market Superiority (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author); Heather M. Whitney, The Autonomy Defense of Private Discrimination 
(2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2922241 [https://perma.cc/7NFH-
QE4R]; cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents 
of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009). 
9 Integration was contemplated as a goal of the FHA from the outset. See 114 CONG. 
REC. 3422 (Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) (describing the legislative aim of 
“truly integrated and balanced living patterns”); see also Brian Patrick Larkin, Note, The 
Forty-Year “First Step”: The Fair Housing Act as an Incomplete Tool for Suburban 
Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1624-30 (2007) (examining the FHA’s goal of 
integration, as discussed in legislative history and judicial opinions, and noting its tension 
  
352 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:349 
 
household choices or counteracting them in some way. In this Article, I take on 
this understudied and undertheorized issue. I critically examine presumed 
normative and doctrinal impediments to addressing homeseeker 
discrimination, and consider how the law’s treatment of this form of bias 
connects conceptually to the project of delivering fair housing. 
My analysis challenges two claims on which there appears to be 
overwhelming legal and scholarly consensus: that the law does not and should 
not reach discriminatory housing search.10 Contrary to all prior analyses of 
which I am aware, I argue that at least some manifestations of homeseeker bias 
can be a normatively appropriate target of fair housing law.11 I also argue, 
contrary to the prevailing wisdom, that existing law can be fairly read to offer 
tools for addressing certain forms of homeseeker bias.12 There are indeed 
significant normative and doctrinal limits on the scope of liability that can 
attach to housing search. But giving homeseekers a free pass to discriminate is 
not the benign, overdetermined move that it is generally thought to be. 
Recognizing the correlative relationship between rights and duties identified 
by Wesley Hohfeld13 helps to illuminate what is at stake. Safeguarding the 
rights of households to fair housing opportunities requires distributing 
corresponding fair housing duties (in some manner) throughout society. The 
fewer the agents who are considered appropriate bearers of those duties, the 
greater the duties must be on some or all of the remaining agents—or the more 
constrained must be the fair housing rights. Thus, keeping homeseekers off the 
roster of parties who are held to account for intentional racial discrimination14 
 
with the goal of free housing choice). The Supreme Court has expressly endorsed the 
integration goal of the FHA, most recently in Texas Department of Housing & Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525-26 (2015).  
10 This is not to suggest that scholars are untroubled by homeseeker discrimination, nor 
that they have systematically considered and rejected every means of reaching it. Rather, 
there is a general tendency in the literature to view addressing homeseeking as a nonstarter 
for a number of overlapping reasons—doctrinal, practical, and normative—and to bypass 
any nuanced exploration of these points. There has also been a tendency to conflate two 
elements that this Article hopes to break apart: the search process itself, and the ultimate 
decision about where to live. The assumption that regulating the former implies regulating 
the latter likely underpins much of the current apparent consensus that homeseeking is 
untouchable. I thank Stacy Seicshnaydre for comments on this point. 
11 See infra Part II. 
12 See infra Part III. 
13 WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 36-42 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919). 
14 Some race-based search behaviors may be unconscious or implicit in nature. See infra 
notes 53, 192 and accompanying text. Under existing doctrinal categories, these count as 
“intentional” forms of race-based decisionmaking and are treated as such here. This need 
not imply equal culpability. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 325-26 (1987) 
(“Understanding the cultural source of our racism obviates the need for fault, as traditionally 
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requires shifting the costs associated with that discrimination somewhere 
else—either back onto members of minority groups who see their rights to fair 
housing accordingly curtailed, or onto other parties who are in a position to 
overcome or compensate for the effects of biased home search.15 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Parts I and II challenge the dominant 
view that racially restrictive housing search16 should be deemed normatively 
off limits as a domain for legal intervention. These Parts address, respectively, 
two primary rationales for ignoring search practices: that homeseekers cannot 
materially influence fair housing opportunities, and that any effort to address 
search would be an impermissible intrusion into autonomy and related 
values.17 Part I examines the empirical effects of housing search bias on 
segregation and concludes that this bias significantly interferes with fair 
housing opportunities. Unaddressed discrimination by homeseekers thus 
produces a disconnect—which I term “the search gap”—between the fair 
housing opportunities that the law aspires to provide and the duties that the law 
imposes on parties not to discriminate in the housing domain.18 
Part II turns to questions of autonomy and associational privacy. Although 
these normative considerations place important constraints on legal 
interventions into housing search, I resist the blanket conclusion that every 
form of intentional homeseeker discrimination must be immunized. Following 
a pattern that can already be found in certain provisions of fair housing law 
(most notably, in the incomplete exemption from liability for so-called “Mrs. 
Murphy” landlords),19 I sketch a conceptual approach that would preserve 
 
conceived, without denying our collective responsibility for racism’s eradication.”). 
15 See infra Part IV (describing some ways in which costs might be shifted). 
16 I use the term “racially restrictive” here to denote segregative forms of race-
consciousness. My use of the terms race-based, biased, and discriminatory as modifiers for 
search carry the same meaning and are likewise meant to exclude race-consciousness 
directed at integrative ends.  
17 These rationales track the factors that Tarunabh Khaitan recently elaborated in 
discussing the law’s choice to extend nondiscrimination duties only to certain actors and not 
others. KHAITAN, supra note 8, at 200 (suggesting the law chooses duty bearers based on 
two factors: the extent to which the duty intrudes into the actor’s “negative liberty,” and the 
efficacy of choosing that duty bearer, which “will depend on its ability to affect another 
person’s access to the basic goods”); id. at 195-213 (using the law’s different treatment of 
landlords and tenants as an example); see also Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 8, at 227 (listing 
“efficacy” and “a concern for personal autonomy and privacy” as leading explanations for 
societal choices not to address discrimination by customers). In the case of discrimination 
by tenants, Khaitan suggests, the intrusion associated with imposing a duty would be high, 
while the efficacy would be low. See KHAITAN, supra note 8, at 200, 212-13.  
18 Of course, the search gap does not alone account for the disconnect between the goals 
of fair housing and the duties imposed by law, but rather forms a subset of a larger 
misalignment between the normative vision of fair housing rights and the duties distributed 
to parties capable of bringing it about. See infra Section I.C. 
19 See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2012)). 
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ultimate decisional autonomy for homeseekers while prohibiting the use of 
categorical exclusionary search tactics. This same approach also offers a novel 
way to address fair housing issues in the roommate context—an arena in which 
housing provision and homeseeking often blur together. 
The analysis then moves from the normative question of what the law 
should do to the doctrinal question of what the law does (or can properly be 
read to do). Part III shows how categorical discrimination by homeseekers 
might be reached through existing legal limits on advertising and statements, 
as well as through constraints on search assisted by real estate agents, websites, 
and apps, without infringing ultimate decisional autonomy. Part IV considers 
the potential and limits of other doctrinal hooks for addressing biased search or 
countering its effects. For example, disparate impact analysis can reach third-
party conduct that interacts with and exacerbates the biases of homeseekers. In 
addition, the FHA’s statutory mandate “affirmatively to further” fair housing20 
supports experimentation designed to counter biased search, from pattern-
disrupting homeseeking tools to strategies that encourage integrative moves. 
This is an especially propitious moment for addressing these issues. In June 
2015, the Supreme Court decided Texas Department of Housing & Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,21 which held that the FHA 
includes a disparate impact cause of action.22 The Court in Inclusive 
Communities also explicitly recognized integration as a continuing goal of the 
FHA.23 In addition, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”) issued a final rule in July 2015 on affirmatively furthering fair 
housing, which directs localities and other entities receiving HUD funding to 
take a data-driven approach to meeting their obligations.24 Meanwhile, 
homebuyers are becoming more directly involved in orchestrating their own 
searches, and technological developments offer new threats and novel 
opportunities in the search domain. In sum, it is becoming both increasingly 
feasible and increasingly important to treat homeseeking as a fair housing 
issue.25 
 
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608(e)(5), 3608(d).  
21 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).  
22 Id. at 2525. 
23 Id. at 2525-26 (“The Court acknowledges the Fair Housing Act’s continuing role in 
moving the Nation toward a more integrated society.”). 
24 See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015) (to be 
codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576 & 903). The direction that HUD will take 
under the Trump administration with respect to this rule, or that the new Congress might 
take legislatively, remains unknown as of this writing. 
25 I refer here to technical feasibility, coupled with the availability of appropriate 
doctrinal tools under existing law. Obvious questions of political feasibility remain, 
sharpened by the possibility of a change in course at HUD or via legislation. See supra note 
24. It is worth observing that not all of the possible responses to the issues highlighted here 
need be federal in nature; states and localities can take the lead in this context as they have 
in related ones, and private actors can also play an important role in leveraging social 
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Before beginning, some notes about scope and emphasis are in order. 
Gaining traction on the neglected topic of housing search requires analytically 
isolating racially biased homeseeking from many other issues with which it is 
plainly entwined as an empirical matter: continuing discrimination by housing 
providers; steering by realtors; public and private land use controls that 
produce economic stratification, including restrictions on the quantity and 
location of housing stock; affordable housing policy decisions at all 
governmental levels; inequities in education and other local goods and 
services; and many others. Biased search is by no means the only obstacle to 
achieving fair housing. But it is an important and neglected obstacle that can 
benefit from close conceptual and doctrinal analysis. Unlike other impediments 
to fair housing, biased housing choice involves conduct that is both overtly 
discriminatory and widely believed to lie beyond the reach of law26—a 
combination that warrants attention. 
I will focus here on moving-in decisions rather than on moving-out 
decisions, although the two decisions obviously interact.27 In addition to 
presenting greatly underexplored legal issues, homeseeking appears to be the 
more foundational housing choice problem. Research shows that the moving-in 
decision is more sensitive to neighborhood racial composition than the 
decision to move out.28 Moreover, racially motivated out-moves are implicitly 
premised on racially motivated in-moves. A family would have no reason to 
leave an existing neighborhood based on its racial composition unless it had 
identified another neighborhood to move into that had a different composition. 
Even when out-moves are motivated by fears of declining property values 
rather than racial composition as such, the dynamic is driven by the anticipated 
racial biases of potential in-movers.29 
Biased homeseeking has also proven to be a more durable segregative force 
than neighborhood exit, and carries greater modern significance. The 
 
norms. Far from sidelining these issues, current political conditions make it all the more 
important to engage them. 
26 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
27 See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 46. 
28 See id. at 133 (citing survey data showing that “when confronted with a neighborhood 
that is one-third black, 59 percent of white respondents in 1992 said they would be 
unwilling to move in, while only 29 percent said they would try to move out”); id. at 50-51 
(discussing differences between entry and exit decisions). Aside from inertia and switching 
costs, existing residents have more information about their communities and thus a 
diminished need to rely on crude proxies like race. See id. at 106; cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 364-75 (2008) (explaining how 
more information about individuals can reduce decisionmakers’ reliance on racial and 
gender proxies).  
29 Put differently, white exit would not be sufficient to sustain segregation in the absence 
of white avoidance. See Freeman & Cai, supra note 7, at 303 (“[W]hite avoidance, in 
addition to the oft-written-about mechanisms of discrimination and white flight, would seem 
to also be a necessity for whites to maintain their spatial distance from blacks.”).  
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phenomenon that Ingrid Gould Ellen has termed “white avoidance”—the 
unwillingness of whites to move into neighborhoods that are already populated 
by a substantial fraction of African American households30—replaced “white 
flight” as a dominant generator of segregation after the latter ebbed in the 
1970s.31 As Michael D. M. Bader and Siri Warkentien observe, “[t]he shift 
from active white flight to passive white avoidance marks a significant change 
in the process of segregation.”32 It is one to which legal scholars should attend. 
Finally, as my reference to white avoidance suggests, I will concentrate 
primarily on racial discrimination by whites against blacks.33 This limited 
focus is not meant to suggest that other forms of discrimination are nonexistent 
or unimportant, nor to deny that they interact with white avoidance in 
important ways—some of which I will discuss. Rather, I wish to direct 
attention to the type of homeseeker conduct that continues to be most strongly 
implicated in the perpetuation of segregation. 
I. IS HOMESEEKING HARMLESS? 
Two broad rationales, singly or in combination, appear to explain most of 
the academic and legal disinterest in addressing biased homeseeker choices.34 
The first, which I take up in this Part, is the idea that homeseekers can do little 
harm through their discriminatory conduct because they lack the power to 
materially influence fair housing opportunities.35 This is simply untrue as an 
empirical matter, at least if one takes a view of fair housing that recognizes 
entrenched segregation as harmful and assigns positive value to advancing 
integration.36 Unaddressed discriminatory homeseeking generates a gap 
 
30 See ELLEN, supra note 6, at 2-3. 
31 See Michael D. M. Bader & Siri Warkentien, The Fragmented Evolution of Racial 
Integration Since the Civil Rights Movement, 3 SOC. SCI. 135, 161 (2016). 
32 Id.; see also Freeman & Cai, supra note 7, at 306 (“While discrimination and white 
flight, the other instruments of segregation, fell out of favor or at least declined, white 
avoidance appears to have been a durable mechanism through which segregation has 
persisted in urban America.”). 
33 The persistence and prevalence of black-white residential segregation in the United 
States explains my primary focus on those two groups in this Article, despite the obvious 
simplification that such a dichotomous focus involves. See, e.g., CAMILLE ZUBRINSKY 
CHARLES, WON’T YOU BE MY NEIGHBOR? RACE, CLASS, AND RESIDENCE IN LOS ANGELES 5 
(2006) (noting the need to enlarge analyses of segregation “beyond black-white relations”).  
34 See, e.g., KHAITAN, supra note 8, at 195-213. 
35 See id. at 212 (contending that actors in certain capacities, including those of tenant 
and consumer, “usually lack the ability to seriously affect anyone’s access to the basic 
goods”). I take up the second rationale, which is grounded in autonomy concerns, below. 
See infra Part II. 
36 Such an understanding is consistent with recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court 
and HUD, and it is the one I adopt for purposes of this Article. See supra notes 23-24 and 
accompanying text. The harms of segregation have been well documented. See, e.g., David 
Card & Jesse Rothstein, Racial Segregation and the Black-White Test Score Gap, 91 J. PUB. 
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between meaningful fair housing rights and the duties that the law is thought to 
impose on parties in the housing domain. Although there is more than one way 
to close this “search gap,” it should not be ignored. 
A. The Harms of Biased Search 
Although discrimination against homeseekers based on race has been illegal 
in the United States since 1968,37 residential segregation remains high in many 
American cities.38 Standard explanations for persistent segregation include 
economic differences that correlate with race; continuing supply-side 
discrimination (for example, by landlords and realtors); and the preferences of 
those selecting housing.39 Although the first two factors plainly contribute to 
segregation, they are insufficient to explain existing patterns;40 homeseeker 
 
ECON. 2158, 2170-80 (2007) (finding that neighborhood racial segregation has negative 
effects on black students’ educational attainment); David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, 
Are Ghettos Good or Bad?, 112 Q.J. ECON. 827, 841-65 (1997) (empirically demonstrating 
the harmful effects of segregated communities for blacks on a range of outcomes, including 
education, employment, and income, and examining possible explanations for these effects); 
Justin Steil, Jorge De la Roca & Ingrid Gould Ellen, Desvinculado y Desigual: Is 
Segregation Harmful to Latinos?, 660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 57, 64-74 
(2015) (finding that segregation is associated with negative effects on educational 
attainment and labor market success for African Americans and Latinos). See generally 
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION (2010); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK 
IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 
(2013).  
37 See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2012)); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 
(1968).  
38 There have been important declines in racial segregation over recent decades 
nationwide, but these declines have been uneven across cities and regions, leaving 
segregation high in many cities. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a 
Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1339-60 (2016) (surveying the social 
science literature on segregation definitions and trends, and noting caveats).  
39 See, e.g., Maria Krysan, Kyle Crowder & Michael D. M. Bader, Pathways to 
Residential Segregation, in CHOOSING HOMES, CHOOSING SCHOOLS 27, 36 (Annette Lareau 
& Kimberly Goyette eds., 2014) (referencing the “three canonical and seemingly distinct 
sets of theoretical arguments” appearing in the vast literature on residential racial 
segregation). 
40 See, e.g., Margery Austin Turner, Limits on Housing and Neighborhood Choice: 
Discrimination and Segregation in U.S. Housing Markets, 41 IND. L. REV. 797, 813 (2008) 
(“[I]f households were distributed across neighborhoods entirely on the basis of income 
rather than race or ethnicity, levels of segregation would be dramatically lower.”); Freeman 
& Cai, supra note 7, at 302-03 (“Neither the discrimination faced by blacks attempting to 
move into white neighborhoods nor white flight from neighborhoods into which blacks 
move will necessarily result in the apartheid-like landscape that characterizes much of urban 
America without whites concomitantly avoiding black neighborhoods.”); see also SHARKEY, 
supra note 36, at 28 (noting that economic differences do not explain the far higher 
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preferences appear to play an independent role.41 Moreover, because housing 
choices are iterative and interdependent, wealth disparities and discrimination 
in housing access can be magnified and replicated through home selection 
choices that take racial composition into account.42 
In the Sections below, I will explain how racial bias enters into housing 
search protocols, clarify that it does more than merely proxy for race-neutral 
variables, and discuss the impediments that it presents to the pursuit of fair 
housing. 
1. Search Heuristics and Racial Bias 
White homeseekers, especially homebuyers, tend to avoid neighborhoods 
with substantial African American populations.43 Neighborhood racial 
composition factors into the preferences of black homeseekers as well, 
although to a much lesser extent and for reasons that are often endogenous to 
perceived white racial preferences.44 Although little research has addressed the 
question,45 it is not hard to imagine how information about race might enter 
into the search process. Racial composition is one of the easiest pieces of 
information to learn about neighborhoods from publicly available data, and it 
 
percentages of black children, including those in middle- and upper-income families, who 
grow up in high-poverty neighborhoods, compared with white children). 
41 See Maria Krysan, Reynolds Farley & Mick P. Couper, In the Eye of the Beholder: 
Racial Beliefs and Residential Segregation, 5 DU BOIS REV. 5, 18 (2008); Seicshnaydre, 
supra note 3, at 980-86. 
42 See infra Section I.A.3 (examining these interactions); see also Krysan, Crowder & 
Bader, supra note 39, at 39-47 (discussing how dynamic processes perpetuate segregation in 
ways not captured by examining individual explanations in isolation). 
43 Studies on preferences and observed moving behavior both support this conclusion. 
See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 131-51 (reviewing literature); see also CHARLES, supra 
note 33, at 125-30 (discussing Los Angeles survey results using the “showcard” method to 
elicit neighborhood racial composition preferences that found “fewer than one-fifth of 
whites ha[d] an ideal neighborhood that was over 20 percent black”); Robert J. Sampson & 
Patrick Sharkey, Neighborhood Selection and the Social Reproduction of Concentrated 
Racial Inequality, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 25 (2008) (finding, in a study tracing the flow of 
moves made by Chicago families, that “80% of whites transition into (or remain in) 
neighborhoods that are predominantly white and nonpoor, whether inside or outside the 
city”). Some recent research designs move beyond stated preferences to attempt to isolate 
the role of race in hypothetical decisionmaking. See, e.g., Michael D. M. Bader & Maria 
Krysan, Community Attraction and Avoidance in Chicago: What’s Race Got to Do with It?, 
660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 261, 275 (2015); infra notes 69-78 and 
accompanying text. 
44 See infra Section I.B.2.  
45 See Bader & Krysan, supra note 43, at 277 (observing that existing studies on revealed 
preferences “fail to reveal how inequality seeps into the [search] process”).  
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may be explicitly used to pre-screen search areas—either as an overt 
desideratum or as a proxy for neighborhood quality.46 
Racial composition may also enter into search heuristics in more subtle 
ways. The cognitive and time demands of the home search process make some 
preliminary winnowing of neighborhoods inevitable.47 Consider the role of 
word-of-mouth neighborhood recommendations (and warnings) that 
househunters receive from people in their familial, social, or employment 
circles—that is, from nonrandom demographic samples of the local population. 
Also suggestive are findings that people tend to be more familiar with 
neighborhoods that are close to them and in which their own race is 
overrepresented.48 If knowledge of a neighborhood is a prerequisite to search 
within it, then the ways in which familiarity is established become important.49 
Home search advice is likely to get boiled down to simple formulas, such as 
invisible boundary lines that should not be crossed. A recent description of 
housing search in Oak Park, Illinois, illustrates this point: “People walk in with 
mental maps and memories of stories they saw on a blog and rumors they’ve 
once been told. Don’t live on the east side of Oak Park.”50 Homebuyers may 
find it especially hard to ignore such bright-line prescriptions even if they 
personally take them with a grain of salt, given the likelihood that others—
including the future homebuyers to whom they will later wish to sell—will 
hear and heed the same rules. More broadly, these and similar heuristics can 
fuel predictions about the future racial composition of the neighborhood and 
trigger concerns about property values and local services.51 The result can be 
 
46 See infra Section I.A.2. 
47 See Bader & Krysan, supra note 43, at 263-64.  
48 See Maria Krysan & Michael D. M. Bader, Racial Blind Spots: Black-White-Latino 
Differences in Community Knowledge, 56 SOC. PROBS. 677, 686-96 (2009). 
49 For example, friends and family may play a large role in establishing familiarity, 
entrenching the influence of past segregation. See Bader & Krysan, supra note 43, at 278. 
Past residential choices also influence whether people perceive a particular neighborhood as 
too far away to consider. See id. at 276 (“Due to the ongoing racial segregation of Chicago, 
what is proximate or too far is racialized.”); see also EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, THE FINE LINE 
27 (1991) (observing that “distance is greatly affected by mental processes such as lumping 
and splitting” and explaining that “we often inflate ‘distances’ across mental divides and 
perceive them as greater than even longer distances within the same entity”). 
50 Emily Badger, How Race Still Influences Where We Choose to Live, WASH. POST: 
WONKBLOG (July 17, 2015, 3:19 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/07/17/how-race-still-influences-
where-we-chose-to-live/ [https://perma.cc/D4LN-UMLM] (relating a conversation with 
Kate Lindberg-Vazquez, a rental housing advisor at Oak Park Regional Housing Center). 
51 See ELLEN, supra note 6, at 135 (observing that “in the case of many whites, much of 
their reluctance [to enter neighborhoods with substantial minority populations] stems from 
fears about the future quality of services delivered in the neighborhood, rather than a simple 
dislike of non-whites”). Property values are widely cited as a reason for race-based 
decisionmaking. See, e.g., id. at 109 (reporting on 1992 Detroit survey responses in which 
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an entrenched neighborhood reputation that becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.52 
Of course, some househunters may simply visit prospective neighborhoods 
and form impressions based on what they observe. Even this alternative is 
deeply infused with racial overtones, however. Recent studies have shown that 
when white participants evaluate neighborhoods shown in video vignettes, an 
objectively identical neighborhood scene (people walking down the street, 
working on cars, and so on) will be rated lower when African American people 
are visible in the scene than when only white people are observed.53 Whether 
this discounting operates at a conscious level or not, it suggests that even those 
white househunters who are open to visiting unknown neighborhoods as part of 
their housing search may end up making racially biased housing choices. 
Technological changes in the mechanics of search could also impact the role 
that racial composition plays in location decisions. Online reviews of 
neighborhoods are becoming more common54 and may increasingly 
supplement or supplant other information sources. If those who post online 
come from a broader mix of demographic backgrounds than the families, 
friends, and coworkers of homebuyers, the results could help to break down 
existing path dependencies in housing choice. However, people may resort to 
online guidance only after having made a first cut based on information 
derived from word-of-mouth recommendations, personal familiarity, or 
explicit screening based on racial composition. Moreover, race-based 
stereotypes about particular areas may become reinforced and amplified 
through repetition online. 
 
“falling property values and rising crime” were the most common reasons provided by white 
respondents for why they would leave a racially mixed area); infra Section IV.C.3 
(discussing the significance of homeownership and prospects for stake-lowering). 
52 See ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING 
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 316 (2012) (explaining the role of “[n]eighborhood reputations” for 
disorder which can produce a “reinforcing cycle” and observing that “[s]ocial perceptions of 
disorder actually had a larger effect on later poverty levels than the inertial path dependence 
for which prior poverty serves as a direct proxy”); Boger, supra note 3, at 1578 (explaining 
that beliefs about lower property values in integrated neighborhoods “tend to become self-
fulfilling prophesies”). 
53 See Maria Krysan et al., Does Race Matter in Neighborhood Preferences? Results 
from a Video Experiment, 115 AM. J. SOC. 527, 541-42, 548-49 (2009); Krysan, Farley & 
Couper, supra note 41, at 15-19. 
54 See, e.g., Melanie Pinola, How Can I Quickly Find the Best Neighborhood(s) in Any 
City—and the Best Hangouts Therein?, LIFEHACKER: ASK LIFEHACKER (May 10, 2012, 
10:00 AM), http://lifehacker.com/5909195/how-can-i-quickly-find-the-best-neighborhoods-
in-any-cityand-the-best-hangouts-therein [https://perma.cc/SP7Q-E999] (describing a 
variety of tools for assessing neighborhoods and accessing reviews about them); 
STREETADVISOR, http://www.streetadvisor.com [https://perma.cc/89SF-YQ8D] (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2016) (presenting user reviews and ratings of neighborhoods and streets). 
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The widespread availability of internet access through mobile devices makes 
information easier to access and parse on the fly. New smartphone apps can 
marshal data and recommend communities to users.55 For example, Dwellr, 
developed by the U.S. Census Bureau, uses Census Bureau data to match users 
with communities based on their preferences—including whether they prefer a 
community mostly made up of families with children.56 And at least one online 
interface, ZipWho.com, allows users to directly filter locations based on racial 
composition (as well as many other dimensions) by choosing demographic 
factors from dropdown menus and specifying upper and lower percentage 
bounds.57 
Racial bias might also work its way into other information tools used by 
homeseekers. For example, concerns about racial bias plagued the now-
withdrawn crowdsourcing app, SketchFactor, which aggregated user reports 
about safety and “sketchiness” in DC neighborhoods.58 Studies showing how 
racial bias can infect impressions about disorder and neighborhood quality 
raise serious concerns about such reports.59 Even objective information about 
safety can produce path dependence, as systematic avoidance of an area 
renders it increasingly less safe.60 
 
55 See Michele Lerner, To Make It Home Sweet Home, There’s an App for That, WASH. 
POST: REAL ESTATE (June 4, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/theres-an-
app-for-that/2015/06/03/62ebdb54-ede4-11e4-8abc-d6aa3bad79dd_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/G2XU-MH3F]. 
56 See Dwellr, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/mobile/dwellr/ 
[https://perma.cc/SR4Y-MTMY] (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
57 ZIPWHO.COM, http://zipwho.com/ [https://perma.cc/R3SB-AP9C] (last visited Nov. 27, 
2016) (billing its service as “[t]he most fun you can legally have with ZIP codes”).  
58 See Andrew Marantz, When an App Is Called Racist, NEW YORKER: CURRENCY (July 
29, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-to-do-when-your-app-is-
racist [https://perma.cc/99R4-BQJK].  
59 See generally Krysan et al., supra note 53; Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. 
Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of 
“Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319 (2004). 
60 See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 35-42 (1961) 
(noting the importance of “eyes upon the street” in making areas safe). Such concerns were 
raised in connection with Microsoft’s “Pedestrian Route Production” app, U.S. Patent No. 
20,090,157,302 (filed Dec. 14, 2007), which contemplated a function that could “tak[e] the 
user through neighborhoods with violent crime statistics below a certain threshold,” id.; see 
also Allison Keyes, This App Was Made for Walking—But Is It Racist?, NPR: DIGITAL LIFE 
(Jan. 19, 2012, 5:13 PM), 
http://m.npr.org/story/145337346?url=/2012/01/25/145337346/this-app-was-madefor-
walking-but-is-it-racist [https://perma.cc/XLH4-E7T3]. Another recently introduced 
walking app likewise incorporates crime statistics. See Liz Camuti, Walkonomics: What 
Makes the Best Route?, AM. SOC’Y LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS: THE DIRT (July 23, 2015), 
https://dirt.asla.org/2015/07/23/walkonomics-what-makes-the-best-route/ 
[https://perma.cc/NLL5-C9DF] (describing the “Walkonomics” app, which rates 
“walkability” based on several factors, including “fear of crime”).  
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More complex predictive algorithms can be readily imagined that would 
either explicitly or implicitly build in racial criteria. Consider, for example, a 
fictitious app designed for households relocating to a new metropolitan area—
call it “Tiebout2Go.”61 Families type in the address of their current home, 
input a commuting range and a price bracket in the new area, and receive a list 
of suitable homes within neighborhoods and local jurisdictions that most 
closely resemble their current environment in terms of demographics, income, 
occupations, aesthetics, political leanings, local services, school quality, and 
proximity to local amenities.62 The software is highly predictive of which 
homes and neighborhoods the user will like, greatly expediting the matching 
process.63 Search costs fall, but so too do the prospects for disrupting 
entrenched housing patterns, including those involving racial composition.64 
 
61 Charles Tiebout is best known for his theory that (under certain strong assumptions) 
households will sort into communities that provide their preferred mix of services, 
amenities, and taxes, making the choice among locations similar to an ordinary shopping 
experience. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416, 422 (1956).  
62 For discussion of past or existing tools making use of very similar approaches, see 
generally John T. Metzger, Clustered Spaces: Racial Profiling in Real Estate Investment 
(2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For example, the “Community 
Calculator Neighborhood Locator” asked users to input the zip code from which they were 
moving along with the city or community to which they were moving, and generated 
recommendations of demographically similar communities. See id. at 17-18, 36 fig.2. This 
tool was the subject of legal challenges. Id. at 17; see also Isaac v. Norwest Mortg., No. Civ. 
A. 300CV0989-L, 2002 WL 1119854, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2002) (granting 
Norwest’s motion for summary judgment on standing grounds), aff’d, 58 F. App’x 595 (5th 
Cir. 2003).  
63 The related idea of using data to generate personalized default rules in various 
domains has received recent scholarly attention. See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2014); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 48-56 (2013). If racial or other 
protected-class data about the housing consumer herself were used as part of the algorithm 
that determined which homes she was likely to prefer, legal prohibitions on steering would 
plainly kick in—just as a real estate agent may not make such predictions herself based on 
her client’s race. For discussion of some normative issues surrounding use of demographic 
data in formulating personalized default rules, see Porat & Strahilevitz, supra, at 1461-67.  
64 The potential for algorithmic approaches to replicate and perpetuate past 
discriminatory patterns has received significant recent attention. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & 
Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 682 (2016) 
(highlighting the concern that algorithms trained on past hiring decisions will automate and 
reinforce past discrimination that might be embedded in those decisions); Anupam Chander, 
The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 13), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795203 [https://perma.cc/4Z4F-
8L2K] (describing “viral discrimination” that can occur when algorithms reproduce past 
discrimination); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 680 
(2017) (observing that “algorithms that include some type of machine learning can lead to 
discriminatory results if the algorithms are trained on historical examples that reflect past 
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Such an app would operate like an especially powerful but less transparent 
word-of-mouth recommendation. Here, instead of the consumer receiving 
recommendations from those in her own circle of acquaintances, she is 
effectively receiving the recommendation from herself, based on her past 
choices—even though those choices may have been made in constrained 
choice settings or generated through biased processes. The capacity of such 
technologies to replicate and thereby entrench past choices is worrisome.65 
Similar concerns attached to earlier forms of “cluster profiling” that were used 
to classify neighborhoods for homeseekers based on demographic data.66 
2. Proxies and Preferences 
Race clearly matters when it comes to housing search. But how much of the 
observed bias in homeseeking can be explained by the idea that racial 
composition serves as a proxy for neutral variables relating to neighborhood 
quality, such as safety, schools, and services? The question connects to two 
potential lines of reasoning.67 First, if neighborhood racial composition were a 
close proxy for neighborhood quality, then it might seem that eradicating race 
from home selection decisions and replacing it with race-neutral factors would 
do little or nothing to address segregated patterns. Second, if neighborhood 
racial composition were a poor proxy for neighborhood quality, then it might 
seem that the provision of better information and more useful proxies would 
solve the problem. 
There is reason for skepticism about both propositions. Empirical work 
suggests that racial composition plays an independent role in home selection 
decisions, producing different results than would be generated based on 
objective neighborhood quality factors alone.68 Yet the capacity of better 
 
prejudice or implicit bias”); cf. Sunstein, supra note 63, at 49-50 (noting that basing defaults 
on past choices may eliminate opportunities for the kind of learning that occurs “as people 
encounter, entirely serendipitously, activities and products that do not in any way reflect 
their past choices”).  
65 Of course, predictive algorithms also endeavor to learn from their users, and could 
update preferences over time. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 63, at 53 (making this point in the 
context of personalized default rules). Algorithms that consciously build in a certain amount 
of random variation could overcome path dependence to generate new learning. See Kroll et 
al., supra note 64, at 683-84; infra notes 305-09 and accompanying text.  
66 See Metzger, supra note 62. 
67 It might also affect the normative assessment of the conduct. See ANDERSON, supra 
note 36, at 71; ELLEN, supra note 6, at 155. Note, however, that constitutional and statutory 
prohibitions on the use of racial classifications to dispense differential treatment do not 
recognize any exception for instances in which race might serve as a proxy for some other 
variable of legitimate interest. See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. 
CT. REV. 99, 106-13 (presenting hypotheticals involving accurate proxies to make this 
point).  
68 See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text. Testing for this proposition is tricky, 
however, and not all researchers have reached the same conclusions. See Valerie A. Lewis, 
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information and tighter proxies to squeeze out the influence of race is greatly 
limited by the interdependent nature of housing search. 
Instructive on the first point are studies that use a factorial analysis to isolate 
the effect of racial composition on hypothetical home purchase decisions.69 
One study published in 2001 asked white respondents in a nationwide 
telephone survey to imagine they had two school-aged children and were in the 
market for a new house.70 They were then asked to indicate the likelihood they 
would buy a hypothetical house that otherwise met their requirements, after 
receiving (randomly generated) neighborhood information along five 
dimensions: school quality, racial composition, property value trends, the 
home’s value relative to those of others in the neighborhood, and crime rate.71 
The study found that “[b]lack neighborhood composition . . . matters 
significantly, even after controlling for proxy variables.”72 A more recent study 
using similar methodology in the Houston metropolitan area likewise found 
that “white respondents were less likely to say they would buy the house as the 
percentage of black residents in the neighborhood increased, even after 
controlling for the proxy variables.”73 
 
Michael O. Emerson & Stephen L. Klineberg, Who We’ll Live with: Neighborhood Racial 
Composition Preferences of Whites, Blacks, and Latinos, 89 SOC. FORCES 1385, 1386 
(2011) (“The debate over whether racial composition has an independent influence on 
neighborhood preferences remains unsettled due to inherent limitations of data and 
methodology.”). Neither revealed location preferences nor preference surveys offer an 
empirically crisp view of motivations, neighborhood quality is difficult to measure, and 
correlations between race and socioeconomic status complicate the picture. See ELLEN, 
supra note 6, at 3-6; Lewis, Emerson & Klineberg, supra, at 1386-88. For a discussion of 
methodological issues surrounding the analysis of residential choice, see generally Elizabeth 
E. Bruch & Robert D. Mare, Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Residential 
Preferences, Residential Mobility, and Neighborhood Change, 42 SOC. METHODOLOGY 103 
(2012).  
69 An initial nationwide survey used this factorial approach to examine white 
preferences. Michael O. Emerson, Karen J. Chai & George Yancey, Does Race Matter in 
Residential Segregation? Exploring the Preferences of White Americans, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 
922, 924-25 (2001). A later study employing the same methodology focused on the Houston 
metropolitan area and included the preferences of blacks and Latinos as well as whites. 
Lewis, Emerson & Klineberg, supra note 68. 
70 Emerson, Chai & Yancey, supra note 69, at 924-27. 
71 Id. at 925-26. 
72 Id. at 931. Whites became unlikely to purchase the home when the black percentage 
was above fifteen percent and became increasingly unlikely as it rose beyond that threshold. 
Id. at 932. The authors concluded, “[o]ur findings suggest a low probability of whites 
moving to neighborhoods with anything but a token black population, even after controlling 
for the reasons they typically give for avoiding residing with African Americans.” Id. The 
effects were found to be especially strong among respondents who had children under age 
eighteen in the home. Id. at 930-31. 
73 Lewis, Emerson & Klineberg, supra note 68, at 1396. 
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Another recent study in the Chicago area examined which, out of a set of 
forty-one real communities, respondents said they would “seriously consider” 
or “never consider.”74 There, “[w]hites’ willingness to seriously consider 
neighborhoods declined rapidly as the percent black and Latino increased,” and 
this effect “existed even in the presence of controls that are thought to explain 
differences in racial preferences” including “home values, school scores, and 
crime rates.”75 Similarly, “[w]hites were more likely to avoid communities as 
both the percentage of African Americans and Latinos increased”76 and 
“[a]gain, these racial differences persisted after controlling for neighborhood 
characteristics.”77 
Although outright racial animus is one explanation for these results, it is also 
possible that respondents are actually applying an implicit discount to some of 
the other quality variables based on the racial composition, reflecting their 
prior beliefs about correlations between neighborhood quality and race.78 The 
fact that these beliefs are empirically faulty does not keep them from exerting 
strong pressure on housing purchase decisions. And the more frequently they 
do so, the more reinforced and entrenched those faulty beliefs become. Finding 
ways to shift reliance to underlying neighborhood quality measures rather than 
racial stereotypes could break this destructive feedback loop.79 
This brings us to the second line of reasoning mentioned above. Could the 
increasing richness and multidimensionality of data about places to live reduce 
reliance on the crude proxy of race and thereby render homeseeking less 
biased?80 The salutary effect of increased information in squeezing out bad 
proxies has been suggested in other contexts, such as employment.81 Home 
 
74 Bader & Krysan, supra note 43, at 262-63. 
75 Id. at 275.  
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 276. Interestingly, “neither violent nor property crime rates had independent 
effects on whether a community would be avoided.” Id. 
78 Emerson, Chai & Yancey, supra note 69, at 932-33 (discussing “the possibility that 
whites cannot or will not divorce race from variables for which race serves as a proxy” and 
that they might, for example, “still think ‘higher crime’ even if told lower crime”). Such a 
possibility is buttressed by work showing that perceptions of crime in an area are influenced 
by race, after controlling for actual crime levels. See Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black 
Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood 
Crime, 107 AM. J. SOC. 717, 718 (2001) (finding “that the percentage of a neighborhood’s 
black population, particularly the percentage young black men, is significantly associated 
with perceptions of the severity of the neighborhood’s crime problem” even after controlling 
for crime rates and other neighborhood characteristics).  
79 See ROITHMAYR, supra note 5, at 57-68 (discussing the “snowballing” dynamic of 
positive feedback loops, which operates to magnify initial advantages and disadvantages).  
80 Cf. Strahilevitz, supra note 28, at 364-75 (examining the possibility that increased 
availability of information about individuals could reduce statistical discrimination in hiring 
and other contexts).  
81 For example, an employer who wishes to avoid hiring an ex-convict might make use 
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selection decisions, however, differ in their deep interdependence. 
Homebuyers in particular may feel they cannot switch to new proxies in the 
absence of assurance that abandonment of racial proxies will be sufficiently 
widespread. Unlike an employer who can achieve gains on her own by 
selecting a tighter-fitting proxy for employee quality, a homeseeker benefits 
from a better proxy for neighborhood quality (at least in the sense of 
safeguarding property values) only if many others will also use similar proxies 
in constructing their bids for homes.82 
Consider in this connection recent work by economists Jungsuk Han and 
Francesco Sangiorgi modeling information acquisition in “beauty contest” 
situations: ones in which each player’s payoff depends not on whether he 
chooses the most objectively “beautiful” candidate, but rather whether he 
chooses the candidate that most others will deem to be the most beautiful.83 
Where the need to coordinate expectations with those of others is greater than 
the desire to choose the best alternative on the merits, a flawed but widely 
shared information source can become a focal point.84 As Han and Sangiorgi 
explain, “[w]hen the coordination motive is sufficiently strong, there exists an 
equilibrium in which all agents choose to focus on the inferior information 
source.”85 Because home values have as their inputs the proxies employed by 
numerous current and future homeseekers, racial composition may be a focal, 
and thus difficult-to-shake, information source. 
 
of criminal records rather than demographic statistical correlations in deciding who to hire. 
See id. at 365-66, 371-73 (discussing this example and noting the potential benefits of 
increased availability of information in reducing statistical discrimination).  
82 See ANDERSON, supra note 36, at 71 (“Although the self-fulfilling prophecy could be 
avoided if whites collectively refused to racially profile neighborhoods, any individual white 
who ignores the racial profile risks a large personal loss in access to advantage for a 
negligible positive impact on the neighborhood’s access.”). 
83 Jungsuk Han & Francesco Sangiorgi, Searching for Information 4 (Oct. 30, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2635392 
[https://perma.cc/9JEZ-4UB2]. The beauty contest metaphor is originally from JOHN 
MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 156 
(1936) (analogizing investment to a contest for choosing the prettiest faces, but one in which 
the winner is “the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average 
preferences of the competitors as a whole”).  
84 See Han & Sangiorgi, supra note 83, at 29 (“We find that agents may collectively 
prefer an inferior information source due to coordination motives.”); cf. Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437, 444, 
454-57 (2006) (discussing use of amenities correlated with demographic characteristics as 
focal points in newly developed communities, where demographic composition cannot yet 
be directly observed). On the use of focal points to solve coordination problems more 
generally, see RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 22-56 (2015); 
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 53-80, 89-118 (1960).  
85 Han & Sangiorgi, supra note 83, at 4.  
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3. Search as an Impediment to Fair Housing 
Biased homeseeking is not a benign phenomenon. Racially restrictive search 
procedures impede fair housing opportunities in at least three interlocking 
ways. First, by entrenching segregated patterns and preferences, race-based 
househunting makes stable integrated choices difficult to initiate, foster, and 
maintain.86 At a most basic level, existing patterns define the choice sets that 
confront homeseekers: one cannot choose an integrated neighborhood that does 
not exist.87 Recent scholarship models how race-based homeseeking creates a 
self-perpetuating segregative cycle that amplifies preexisting income 
inequalities88: in order to have more same-race neighbors, whites choose more 
wealthy neighborhoods than they otherwise would, while blacks accept less 
wealthy neighborhoods.89 The resulting dynamic fuels continuing racial 
 
86 See SCHELLING, supra note 5, at 146 (“People who have to choose between polarized 
extremes—a white neighborhood or a black . . . will often choose in the way that reinforces 
the polarization.”). 
87 See Lincoln Quillian, A Comparison of Traditional and Discrete-Choice Approaches 
to the Analysis of Residential Mobility and Locational Attainment, 660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 240, 243-44 (2015) (observing that “[a] household cannot move to a 
neighborhood that does not exist,” and explaining how the choice set is fixed in advance of 
the individual household’s choice). 
88 See, e.g., Alejandro Badel, A Racial Inequality Trap (Research Div., Fed. Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2015-034A, 2015), 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2015/2015-034.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A8X-LA3L]. 
89 Id. at 3; see also Elizabeth E. Bruch, How Population Structure Shapes Neighborhood 
Segregation, 119 AM. J. SOC. 1221, 1252 (2014) (finding, in a stylized simulation model, 
that “when blacks are poorer, on average, than whites, high-income blacks will live in 
poorer neighborhoods, on average, than their white counterparts” and observing that “this 
pattern is also found in U.S. census data” (citing JOHN R. LOGAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: 
THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS AND ASIANS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 
(2011), https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report0727.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PY6S-9QG5])); Quillian, supra note 87, at 255-56 (finding, based on 
conditional logit analysis, “that the huge gap in the odds of moving into a poor 
neighborhood between whites and blacks mostly reflects the fact that whites move into 
white neighborhoods and blacks move into black neighborhoods, and there is a large 
average difference in poverty rates and income between white and black neighborhoods”); 
see also SHARKEY, supra note 36, at 27-28 (“Two out of three African American children 
born from 1985 to 2000 have been raised in neighborhoods with at least 20 percent poverty, 
compared to just 6 percent of whites.”); John Eligon & Robert Gebeloff, Affluent and Black, 
and Still Trapped by Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/milwaukee-segregation-wealthy-black-
families.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7E9K-HCZE] (“In many of America’s largest 
metropolitan areas, including New York, Chicago and Los Angeles, black families making 
$100,000 or more are more likely to live in poorer neighborhoods than even white 
households making less than $25,000.”). 
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inequality, visiting significant harm on African Americans while producing 
relatively small gains for whites.90 
Second, biased homeseeking by white households produces price premiums 
in white neighborhoods relative to homes in African American 
neighborhoods.91 Homes in white neighborhoods also appreciate at higher rates 
for a given level of housing stock and local amenities.92 As the housing wealth 
that African Americans and whites accumulate over time diverges as a result of 
this dynamic, African Americans are less able to compete for homes in more 
affluent neighborhoods.93 Through this mechanism, housing search decisions 
tighten the connection between race and wealth, and thereby withdraw housing 
opportunities based on race.94 
 
90 Badel, supra note 88, at 27 (“[E]ven though racial preferences are the engine of this 
inequality trap, racial integration implies large welfare gains for black households and 
relatively small losses for white households.”). 
91 See David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, The Rise and Decline of 
the American Ghetto, 107 J. POL. ECON. 455, 457-58 (1999) (“By 1990 . . . whites pay more 
for equivalent housing than blacks in more segregated metropolitan areas, suggesting that 
decentralized racism has replaced centralized racism as the factor influencing residential 
location.”); Casey J. Dawkins, Recent Evidence on the Continuing Causes of Black-White 
Residential Segregation, 26 J. URB. AFF. 379, 389-90 (2004) (summarizing hedonic 
regression studies, which suggest there is a premium associated with segregated white areas, 
although its magnitude may be changing in certain areas); John Yinger, Hedonic Estimates 
of Neighborhood Ethnic Preferences, 44 PUB. FIN. REV. 22, 44 (2016) (presenting findings 
based on hedonic regression models that, among other results, “indicate that houses in all-
white neighborhoods may have housing prices up to one-third higher than houses in 
integrated neighborhoods, all else equal”); see also Patrick Bayer et al., A Dynamic Model 
of Demand for Houses and Neighborhoods, 84 ECONOMETRICA 893, 928-31 (2016) (finding 
a dynamic model produces lower estimates for willingness to pay for same-race neighbors). 
92 See Chenoa Flippen, Unequal Returns to Housing Investments? A Study of Real 
Housing Appreciation Among Black, White, and Hispanic Households, 82 SOC. FORCES 
1523, 1540 (2004) (reporting results finding that “the negative effect on home appreciation 
of having a very large initial black population (i.e., greater than 65%) at the time of 
purchase remains statistically significant even after accounting for all other factors that 
influence housing appreciation”); Jacob S. Rugh, Len Albright & Douglas S. Massey, Race, 
Space, and Cumulative Disadvantage: A Case Study of the Subprime Lending Collapse, 62 
SOC. PROBS. 186, 195 (2015) (finding confirmation of “the well-documented disparity in 
home appreciation rates by race and neighborhood racial composition” in data showing that 
black borrowers saw smaller local home price gains between 2000 and the peak in 2006-
2007 than white borrowers (139% versus 168%), yet the local home price losses that 
followed were deeper for black borrowers than for white borrowers). 
93 See ROITHMAYR, supra note 5, at 109. Segregation produces harms through other 
mechanisms as well, many of which feed back into the ability to compete effectively for the 
housing of one’s choice. For example, segregation in housing translates into shortfalls in 
educational and employment opportunities. See ANDERSON, supra note 36, at 23-43. 
Housing segregation also constrains who people are likely to meet, date, and marry. See 
Emens, supra note 8, at 1396-1400. 
94 See, e.g., ROITHMAYR, supra note 5, at 63-64, 109-15 (discussing ways that racial 
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Third, race-based search procedures both motivate and facilitate housing 
discrimination by those providing access to housing. Thus, landlords, realtors, 
or developers may be incentivized to discriminate in order to produce housing 
patterns that are pleasing to their target audiences.95 Biased search can also 
make it easier for providers of housing to achieve segregated results without 
resorting to overt discrimination. For example, housing providers may embed 
housing amenities that enable parties to more easily self-select into 
segregation.96 The prevalence of racially biased housing consumers can thus 
alter the mix of housing that is provided in the marketplace as well as the 
degree of segregation that it exhibits. 
B. Are There Countervailing Considerations? 
One might concede that racially biased search can alter housing opportunity 
sets and even generate certain kinds of disadvantage, but deny that it represents 
a phenomenon that, on balance, justifies intervention. On the contrary, the 
argument might run, any effort to reduce racially restrictive homeseeking will 
primarily work to the disadvantage of African American households by fueling 
gentrification and compromising their efforts to form and maintain identifiably 
black neighborhoods. Do these countervailing concerns undermine the claims 
above? 
1. Gentrification and Displacement 
To this point, the discussion of biased search heuristics has used as its 
prototype the white homeseeker who shuns neighborhoods that include more 
than a small percentage of minority households. This model of biased search 
may seem anachronistic or at least incomplete. Indeed, given the dynamics of 
gentrification, one might wonder whether the real threat to minority 
communities today is not the risk that white households will stay out, but 
rather that they will move in—not “white avoidance,” but “white invasion.”97 
On this account, it might seem that biased homeseeking could at least diminish 
the chance that minority households will be displaced through rising home 
prices or that communities of color will be torn apart by rapid changes. 
Addressing this line of reasoning requires us to consider gentrification’s 
place within the larger frame of urban segregation. Although gentrification 
 
disparities in housing wealth become self-reinforcing). 
95 For example, discrimination by landlords that is designed to cater to the preferences of 
other tenants may be a significant concern. See generally Pierre-Philippe Combes et al., 
Neighbor Discrimination: Theory and Evidence from the French Rental Market (Oct. 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2866997 [https://perma.cc/UY7B-
LHY3] (modeling and testing the influence of customer discrimination in the French rental 
market based on whether a landlord owns one or many units in the same building).  
96 See Strahilevitz, supra note 84 (discussing the use of exclusionary amenities in private 
communities). 
97 On white avoidance and white invasion, see generally Freeman & Cai, supra note 7. 
  
370 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:349 
 
stereotypically connotes dramatic racial turnover and displacement, its 
association with these effects is empirically contested.98 A recent study 
focusing specifically on white entry into black neighborhoods finds that 
despite a marked uptick in such invasion in the decade 2000 to 2010, it 
remained a relatively limited phenomenon affecting no more than eleven 
percent of predominantly black census tracts.99 Recent research on Chicago 
neighborhoods suggests that predominantly minority neighborhoods are less 
likely to gentrify or to continue on a path of gentrification than neighborhoods 
with a substantial proportion of whites.100 Despite receiving the lion’s share of 
attention, gentrification appears to be empirically overshadowed by stasis and 
decline, at least in cities like Chicago and Philadelphia.101 
 
98 This is partly a matter of definition. See, e.g., Jackelyn Hwang & Robert J. Sampson, 
Divergent Pathways of Gentrification: Racial Inequality and the Social Order of Renewal in 
Chicago Neighborhoods, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 726, 727 (2014) (adopting a definition of 
gentrification that “does not require that displacement or racial turnover occur, which are 
still widely debated empirical questions”); see also Lei Ding, Jackelyn Hwang & Eileen 
Divringi, Gentrification and Residential Mobility in Philadelphia, 61 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. 
ECON. 38, 39-40, 49 (2016) (reviewing past literature on displacement and presenting results 
from their 2002 to 2014 mobility study in Philadelphia showing that “more vulnerable 
individuals . . . are not necessarily more likely to move from gentrifying neighborhoods than 
similar residents in nongentrifying neighborhoods”—though they were more likely to 
experience downward mobility if they did move); Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine M. 
O’Regan, How Low Income Neighborhoods Change: Entry, Exit, and Enhancement, 41 
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 89, 92-94, 96-97 (2011) (presenting findings, based on a study 
of low-income neighborhoods in the 1990s, suggesting that gentrification did not produce 
elevated levels of displacement or racial change).  
99 See Freeman & Cai, supra note 7, at 306 (defining white invasion “as an increase in 
the white population that represents at least 5 percent of the total population at the beginning 
of the decade”); id. at 305-06 (finding that eighty-nine percent of predominantly black 
neighborhoods, defined as over fifty percent non-Hispanic black in 2000, did not experience 
white invasion between 2000 and 2010). The proportion of uninvaded tracts rises to nearly 
ninety-five percent if black neighborhoods are defined as ninety percent non-Hispanic black. 
See id. at 309, 312 tbl.1. The distribution of white invasion has not been evenly spread 
across the country, however, and affects larger and smaller percentages of tracts in different 
areas. See id. at 309 fig.2. 
100 See Hwang & Sampson, supra note 98, at 744-48. 
101 See, e.g., NATHALIE P. VOORHEES CTR. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & CMTY. IMPROVEMENT, 
UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., THE SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE OF CHICAGO’S COMMUNITY AREAS 
(1970-2010): GENTRIFICATION INDEX 2 (2014), 
http://media.wix.com/ugd/992726_3653535630f748cbae3a4f1d9db3bb5c.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R7PE-BL95] (“Although much attention has been given to neighborhood 
upgrading (gentrification), our analysis illustrates that decline is more prevalent in the City 
of Chicago as a whole.”). This recent study of Chicago’s seventy-seven official community 
areas using a thirteen-factor gentrification index found that only nine communities 
gentrified during the period 1970 to 2010, three more had smaller increases in factors 
correlated with gentrification, thirty-four did not experience a major change, and thirty-one 
experienced mild to severe decreases—with the largest decreases concentrated in the city’s 
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None of this is meant to deny that invasive or disruptive gentrification exists 
or that it carries the potential to visit significant harm on communities, through 
displacement or otherwise.102 Nor does the current infrequency of a 
phenomenon mean that it should be ignored when setting policy, especially if 
the policies under discussion could alter its prevalence. Yet the threat of 
gentrification does not offer a meaningful argument in favor of disregarding 
homeseeker bias. On the contrary, harmful gentrification may be best 
understood as a process that is itself crucially fueled by race-based homeseeker 
choices.103 
An analogy can be drawn to the cascading dynamics of white flight.104 In 
the standard gentrification story, there is an initial entry into a largely minority 
 
far south and west sides in majority African American or Latino communities. Id. at 22-25, 
28. Recent work tracing neighborhood changes in Philadelphia employing an income-based 
methodology similarly “found that only 15 of Philadelphia’s 372 residential census tracts 
gentrified from 2000 to 2014,” while “[m]ore than 10 times that many census tracts—164 in 
all—experienced statistically significant drops in median household income during the 
period studied.” EMILY DOWDALL, PEW CHARITABLE TR., PHILADELPHIA’S CHANGING 
NEIGHBORHOODS: GENTRIFICATION AND OTHER SHIFTS SINCE 2000, at 1 (2016), 
http://pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/05/philadelphias_changing_neighborhoods.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9BLP-NL4G]. Another study of Philadelphia census tracts using a 
different methodology found a higher rate of gentrification between 2000 and 2013, though 
still involving a minority of tracts. See Ding, Hwang & Divringi, supra note 98, at 42 (“Of 
Philadelphia’s 365 tracts with substantial population sizes, we categorized 56 out of its 184 
gentrifiable tracts as gentrifying.”).  
102 Clearly, some neighborhoods do experience the kind of rapid racial change that is 
most often associated with harmful gentrification, even if this is not the statistically most 
common pattern. For example, of the fifteen gentrified tracts identified in the 2014 Pew 
study of Philadelphia cited above, twelve “had higher percentages of white residents in 2000 
than the city as a whole” but the other three were “predominantly working-class African-
American tracts” in the Graduate Hospital neighborhood that experienced a drastic racial 
change with the black population falling by more than half as the white population tripled. 
DOWDALL, supra note 101, at 2.  
103 See Hwang & Sampson, supra note 98, at 728-31. There are other important factors 
that drive gentrification as well, such as supply constraints on housing, that might be 
separately addressed. See, e.g., John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 91 (2014). 
104 See Freeman & Cai, supra note 7, at 315 (“[J]ust as the integration created by blacks 
moving into white neighborhoods often proved temporary, there is the risk that these black 
neighborhoods [experiencing white entry] will soon become predominantly white.”). For 
discussion of neighborhood “tipping” models, see generally Thomas C. Schelling, A Process 
of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
ECONOMIC LIFE 157 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972). Recent empirical work using data from 
1970 to 2000 has come to inconsistent conclusions as to whether a tipping model like the 
one Schelling developed matches with the way in which neighborhoods changed. Compare 
William Easterly, Empirics of Strategic Interdependence: The Case of the Racial Tipping 
Point, 9 B.E. J. MACROECONOMICS 1 (2009) (finding that Schelling’s model of strategic 
interaction is largely not supported by the data), with David Card, Alexandre Mas & Jesse 
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neighborhood by a few white households.105 Their entrance might be 
precipitated by neighborhood amenities or affordable rehabbing opportunities, 
but their presence changes the composition of the neighborhood in ways likely 
to attract more whites. Once the area becomes known as a gentrifying one, 
white households may enter in increasing numbers based on anticipated racial 
trends.106 Plausibly, the changing racial composition acts as an accelerant that 
causes more abrupt and disruptive changes than would occur in the absence of 
race-based decisionmaking. Seen through this lens, gentrification does not 
offer a counterpoint to integrative efforts, but rather another reason why 
integrative efforts are crucial to pursue. 
Significantly, people moving into gentrifying neighborhoods do so against a 
backdrop of pervasive segregation—one in which neighborhoods may be 
viewed by large segments of the future resale market in binary terms based on 
the predominant race of the residents. In such a world, white homeseekers may 
be willing to take a chance on a gentrifying neighborhood only once it seems a 
sure bet to become predominantly white. A herding response would explain 
why intensive gentrification occurs within certain neighborhoods, while many 
other neighborhoods receive no economic boost at all. On this account, the 
most harmful forms of gentrification are artifacts of race-based homeseeking, 
not arguments for tolerating it. If more neighborhoods were stably integrated, 
property value increases and demographic changes would likely occur more 
evenly and organically across a larger set of neighborhoods.107 
2. Minority Preferences for Segregated Neighborhoods 
Discussions about integration, when they do not run entirely aground on the 
issue of gentrification, are often stopped dead in their tracks by the assertion 
 
Rothstein, Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation, 123 Q.J. ECON. 177 (2008) (finding 
evidence of tipping in most cities, and calculating city-specific tipping points). 
105 This stylized account is meant to capture the process popularly associated with 
harmful gentrification, although gentrification occurs through a variety of processes that 
often diverge from this prototype. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
106 Gentrification involves in-movers who are wealthier than existing residents, so later 
in-movers could be making decisions based only on the changing economic profile of the 
area rather than its changing racial composition. It is also possible that many white in-
movers flock to gentrifying areas because they seek racial diversity, even as their increasing 
numbers make its sustainability less likely. Research suggests, however, that this increased 
amenability to diversity has limits, and that racial composition helps explain why 
gentrification occurs in some places and not others. See Hwang & Sampson, supra note 98, 
at 744-46. 
107 Evidence suggests that neighborhood gains may be capable of benefiting both in-
movers and stayers without producing heightened levels of displacement. See, e.g., Ellen & 
O’Regan, supra note 98, at 92-96. Examining the conditions under which such 
neighborhood upgrading can occur, and the potential for it to be combined with sustainable 
increases in integration, represent important lines for future research.  
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that segregated minority communities prefer to stay that way.108 This claim 
might seem to offer a powerful critique to the line of reasoning pursued here. 
So what if white homeseekers are using biased heuristics to skirt African 
American neighborhoods? To suggest that this is a problem might seem to 
offensively imply that the minority neighborhoods somehow “need” white 
households in their midst.109 
Yet the available evidence does not suggest that African American 
households generally desire high levels of racial separation. Far from an 
entrenched desire for absolute segregation, most preference surveys show 
black respondents respond favorably to a wide range of potential demographic 
mixes—a much wider mix than white respondents favor.110 Summing up a 
large number of studies, Casey Dawkins concludes that “evidence suggests that 
while both whites and blacks may have preferences for living in neighborhoods 
where their own race is in the majority, such preferences are still much 
stronger among whites, on average, than among blacks.”111 A recent Chicago-
area study found the same pattern, with black respondents reporting a much 
greater willingness than whites to consider a wide mix of communities ranging 
“from nearly all-white to nearly all-black and almost everything between.”112 
 
108 See, e.g., CHARLES, supra note 33, at 3 (“[A]ccording to this argument, racial 
residential segregation persists because that is the way everyone wants it: actual residential 
patterns reflect our unconstrained choices.”).  
109 See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 160 (“Policies to promote neighborhood racial 
mixing have also been attacked for being demeaning to minorities, that is, for presuming 
that there is something inherently wrong with all-black communities.”). 
110 There is strong and consistent evidence of this asymmetry. See, e.g., ELLEN, supra 
note 6, at 46 (“[S]urvey data consistently show that black households are far more open 
[than white households] to a variety of racial mixes.”); Maria Krysan & Reynolds Farley, 
The Residential Preferences of Blacks: Do They Explain Persistent Segregation?, 80 SOC. 
FORCES 937, 960 (2002) (“There is no mistaking the pattern [shown by preference survey 
data]. Blacks are much more willing to live with white neighbors than whites are willing to 
live with African Americans. And African Americans, in great numbers, are willing to live 
in a neighborhood where they are one of a handful of black residents.”). Although the gap 
between the stated preferences of black and white respondents has been closing in recent 
years, black respondents remain more open, on average, to integrated neighborhood 
environments. See MARIA KRYSAN & SARAH PATTON MOBERG, UNIV. OF ILL., INST. OF 
GOV’T & PUB. AFFAIRS, TRENDS IN RACIAL ATTITUDES (2016), 
https://igpa.uillinois.edu/programs/racial-attitudes [https://perma.cc/GB2R-AY9L] (“A 
question in which blacks were asked if they would oppose living in a neighborhood that was 
half white shows . . . just 10 percent either somewhat or strongly opposed this in 2014,” 
compared with nineteen percent of whites who said they “would be opposed to living in a 
half-black neighborhood”).  
111 Dawkins, supra note 91, at 393; see also CHARLES, supra note 33, at 125 (“Blacks, 
Latinos, and Asians . . . all prefer substantially more racial integration and are more 
comfortable than whites as numerical minorities. Still, each group’s preference for same-
race neighbors exceeds whites’ preferences for integration.”).  
112 Bader & Krysan, supra note 43, at 277. As Bader and Krysan explain, these findings 
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The factors that shape minority preferences for predominantly minority 
neighborhoods also deserve attention. Here, research offers stronger support 
for explanations rooted in fear of discrimination by white neighbors than ones 
based on in-group favoritism.113 As Maria Krysan and her coauthors explain, 
“you cannot disentangle a preference from the historical and contemporary 
experiences that African Americans have had with respect to discriminatory 
actions of whites and institutional biases firmly imbedded in the housing 
market.”114 Similarly, Sheryll Cashin speaks of “integration exhaustion” 
experienced by blacks, who would rather avoid facing potential discrimination 
or hostility in a mostly white neighborhood.115 To the extent that preferences 
are inferred from observed patterns of residential choice by African American 
households, it also becomes important to recognize the severe constraints that 
often accompany home searches.116 One of the most important constraints may 
well be existing segregated patterns that typically limit blacks to “one of two 
choices: an almost all-black neighborhood or one where blacks are few.”117 
 
“undermine the idea that black self-segregation is responsible for metropolitan patterns of 
segregation.” Id. To be sure, even mild preferences for same-race neighbors can generate 
powerful segregative dynamics. See, e.g., SCHELLING, supra note 5, at 147-66; Mark Fossett, 
Ethnic Preferences, Social Distance Dynamics, and Residential Segregation: Theoretical 
Explorations Using Simulation Analysis, 30 J. MATHEMATICAL SOC. 185, 201 (2006) 
(observing that even weak preferences for same-race neighbors will be segregative when 
held by numeric minorities, if they exceed the group’s representation in the population). But 
relatively weak preferences that are also significantly endogenous to discrimination and 
existing choice sets are less likely to present binding constraints on greater integration.  
113 See Krysan & Farley, supra note 110, at 965 (“[B]oth the qualitative and quantitative 
assessments of unwillingness to move into an all-white neighborhood point to the important 
role of African Americans’ perceptions of whites’ hostility and discrimination: African 
Americans who thought whites to be discriminatory were less willing to pioneer and when 
directly asked why they would not move into such a neighborhood, the majority gave 
reasons associated with hostility and discrimination.”); see also CHARLES, supra note 33, at 
98 (“[A]reas that are overwhelmingly white, or at least largely devoid of coethnics, are often 
perceived by nonwhites as hostile and unwelcoming.”). By contrast, “[t]he preferences of 
whites appear to be more directly shaped by active racial prejudice . . . than by fears of out-
group hostility or neutral ethnocentrism.” CHARLES, supra, at 98.  
114 Krysan, Crowder & Bader, supra note 39, at 40. 
115 See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION 9, 17-32 (2004). 
116 See Stefanie DeLuca, What Is the Role of Housing Policy? Considering Choice and 
Social Science Evidence, 34 J. URB. AFF. 21, 25-26 (2012) (urging attention to the processes 
of preference formation and the constraints under which preferences are formed); Krysan, 
Crowder & Bader, supra note 39, at 47-52 (citing research on the often time-pressured and 
involuntary moves undertaken by low-income African American households, and other 
economic limitations that “call[] into question the very relevance of the idea of choice and 
preferences”).  
117 CASHIN, supra note 115, at 17; see also Jacob L. Vigdor, Residential Segregation and 
Preference Misalignment, 54 J. URB. ECON. 587, 589 (2003) (“The indices reveal that the 
nationwide proportion of Black households living in overwhelmingly Black neighborhoods 
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Nonetheless, black preferences are obviously heterogeneous and include 
some affirmative preferences for predominantly black neighborhoods.118 And 
there is at least anecdotal evidence of African American communities seeking 
to maintain an area’s racial composition against in-movers.119 Yet even these 
reactions may be understood not as a response to integration as such, but rather 
to a societal pattern in which segregated minority neighborhoods are shunned 
by whites unless and until there is evidence that the area is going to be 
transformed into a wealthier and predominantly white area. Preferences formed 
in the shadow of entrenched segregation and dichotomous white responses—
complete avoidance or outright takeover—are unlikely to be reflective of 
preferences that might hold under different conditions. Disrupting the search 
dynamics that contribute to segregation and resegregation could make 
integration both more stable and more attractive. 
C. The Search Gap 
The discussion above establishes that discriminatory search perpetuates 
segregation and constrains housing choices for many households. Leaving it 
unaddressed produces what I term here “the search gap”—the distance that 
discriminatory search patterns interpose between meaningful fair housing 
opportunities and the antidiscrimination duties that the law is understood to 
impose.120 The search gap is one component of a larger disconnect between 
rights and duties that plays an underappreciated role in conflicts over 
antidiscrimination law. In Hohfeld’s famous schema, rights and duties are 
“jural correlatives”: if one party holds a right, some other party (or parties) 
must hold the corresponding duty.121 Conceptually, there can be no gap 
between rights and duties; they must match up as a matter of logic. 
 
vastly exceeds the proportion of Black survey respondents stating a preference for such 
neighborhoods. The indices also reveal, however, that the nationwide proportion of Black 
households with few or no Black neighbors exceeds the proportion stating a preference for 
such neighborhoods.”). 
118 See CASHIN, supra note 115, at 17-32 (discussing the range of attitudes blacks hold 
with respect to racial composition); Vigdor, supra note 117, at 588, 602 (estimating, based 
on data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality that elicits preferences about “ideal” 
neighborhood composition, that “[r]oughly 3% of the Black population in each metropolitan 
area would live on a block where more than 14 out of 15 residents (or 96.7%) were Black”).  
119 See Ginia Bellafante, In Bed-Stuy Housing Market, Profit and Preservation Battle, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/nyregion/in-bed-stuy-
housing-market-profit-and-preservation-battle.html [http://perma.cc/TCW9-KWE7].  
120 Biased search is not the only source of a gap between rights and duties in the fair 
housing arena, nor is it the only factor contributing to the persistence of segregation. See, 
e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra note 3, at 980-81. But it is an important contributor to segregation 
that might be reached more effectively than it is presently. See id. at 972 (observing that, by 
focusing only on the interactions between minority homeseekers and housing access 
providers, “[t]he law reaches only two parties in a three-party tango”).  
121 HOHFELD, supra note 13, at 36.  
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Nonetheless, it is possible to hold inconsistent ideas about the respective reach 
of rights and duties, as I suggest antidiscrimination law often does. 
Civil rights flow from a proposition about the moral irrelevance of protected 
status, and seek to ensure that people’s lives will be not arbitrarily constrained 
in certain important realms (such as employment, public accommodations, and 
housing) because of that status.122 Like property rights, antidiscrimination 
rights are “multital” in character—corresponding not to a duty held by a single 
party but rather to a set of duties held by many parties.123 Unlike a property 
right, however, antidiscrimination law does not impose duties universally on 
the rest of the world with the functional equivalent of a “keep out” sign.124 The 
law focuses instead on eliminating particular discriminatory acts committed by 
a limited slate of identifiable actors whose conduct is both reachable and 
deemed to be the proper business of law.125 
As a result, the law does not reach the full universe of discriminatory acts 
that reduce housing opportunities based on protected status. There is some 
discriminatory conduct that we cannot reach, and some discriminatory conduct 
that we seem unwilling to reach. For example, we cannot reach discriminatory 
conduct that occurred long in the past or that is too subtle or diffuse to pin on 
particular actors. Conduct that society is presently unwilling to reach can be 
found, for example, in various exceptions to antidiscrimination law.126 
Discriminatory homeseeker conduct spans the “can’t reach” and “won’t reach” 
categories. Some of this conduct might be impossible to prove, but there is also 
 
122 See Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming July 2017) (manuscript at 1), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2730845 [https://perma.cc/VP3Z-
5YPS] (identifying the goal of employment discrimination law as the elimination or redress 
of “status causation”—workplace harms caused by one’s protected status).  
123 The term “multital” is Hohfeld’s; it corresponds to in rem (as opposed to in 
personam) rights. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 712 (1917); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry 
E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 781-82 (2001) 
(discussing Hohfeld’s idea of multital rights, for which he offered the example of land 
ownership).  
124 See KHAITAN, supra note 8, at 62 (“Unlike typical duties in criminal law or the law of 
torts, the duties of discrimination law are not borne by everyone. Instead of a universal 
approach, the law identifies specific types of persons to impose its burdens.”). 
125 In some cases, the discriminatory preferences of one party can be reached by 
imposing duties on a different party to enforce the correlative right in question. See, e.g., 
Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 848 (2001) 
(explaining that where customers have biased preferences, “[t]he employee’s correlative 
right [not to be discriminated against] is vindicated . . . not by suing customers, but by 
forbidding those who hire the people who deal with customers from raising ‘customer 
preferences’ as a defense”); infra Section III.D (discussing potential liability in cases of 
assisted search).  
126 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2012) (setting out the FHA’s single-family 
homeowner and “Mrs. Murphy” exemptions). 
  
2017] SEARCHING FOR FAIR HOUSING 377 
 
a widespread view that reaching it would be normatively unacceptable even if 
it were possible.127 This suggests that, for many, the most normatively 
attractive account of duties may not correspond to the most normatively 
attractive account of rights. 
There is more than one way to reconcile this inconsistency. Most obviously, 
society can focus on distributing enumerated duties based on its preferred 
normative criteria for imposing liability, and then simply tailor rights to 
match.128 At first this might seem not only correct, but inevitable. All the law 
can ever do is grant the rights that match up to the liabilities that it imposes. 
But there is no reason to assume that the analysis should start with duties, and 
then reverse engineer rights. It might seem more in keeping with the spirit of 
antidiscrimination law to do the opposite: shape liability in ways that are 
designed to make race irrelevant to housing opportunities. Thus, we might 
begin with the premise that every household has the right to a set of housing 
options that is not materially constricted by race, and then set about 
distributing duties throughout society in a manner calculated to achieve this 
result. If the slate of duty holders cannot be broadened to capture all 
discriminatory conduct, then heavier burdens must be placed on other actors. 
Of course, the relevant statutory scheme will determine which of these 
approaches, or what combination of them, can be carried out under existing 
law—a point I will come to later. My point at this stage is purely conceptual. If 
the law cannot or will not impose nondiscrimination duties on homeseekers, 
the costs associated with their discriminatory choices must fall elsewhere—
whether on the members of protected groups who are disadvantaged by biased 
search, on parties who are in a position to influence or channel homeseeker 
choices, or somewhere else. Significantly, then, the parties potentially 
burdened by unaddressed bias in homeseeking include not only those directly 
disadvantaged, but also third parties who may be required by the law to help 
take up the slack. It thus becomes important to parse the conventional 
 
127 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 36, at 175 (defining an “informal realm” that 
includes “people’s choices of friends, acquaintances, associates, and neighbors,” and stating 
that “antidiscrimination laws should not cover such informal discrimination”); ELLEN, supra 
note 6, at 169 (“[F]or obvious reasons, policies that restrict people’s freedom to live where 
they want should be avoided.”); KHAITAN, supra note 8, at 195-213 (examining reasons for 
the law’s imposition of duties on certain parties and not others, and concluding that “[t]he 
puzzling distribution of the antidiscrimination duty makes sense, after all”); Seicshnaydre, 
supra note 3, at 1000 (contending that attaching liability to whites’ segregative housing 
choices would be “untenable for a variety of reasons”). 
128 For example, focusing on certain actors who intentionally discriminate corresponds to 
what Alan Freeman has called “the perpetrator perspective.” Alan David Freeman, 
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of 
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978); see also Zatz, supra note 
122 (manuscript at 6-7, 31-37) (describing how this perspective operates within the 
employment discrimination context).  
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assumption that homeseeker discrimination is normatively unreachable. The 
next Part takes up that task. 
II. THE AUTONOMY OBJECTION 
The second principal rationale for exempting biased homeseeking, apart 
from its alleged harmlessness, is that attempting to address it would represent 
too serious an intrusion on normative values like decisional autonomy, privacy, 
and intimate association, which I will refer to collectively here as autonomy. It 
might seem that nothing is more central to the identity of a family than 
choosing where to live. The idea that the process of selecting a home could be 
anyone else’s business may seem intuitively repugnant. But this assumption 
requires investigation. After all, it was once mainstream to view ownership as 
conferring an unqualified right to refuse a transfer, as well as the right to 
control who would move in nearby.129 Section A probes the basis for shielding 
search that is, by hypothesis, socially harmful. Section B then develops an 
account of the duties that might appropriately be placed on homeseekers, 
drawing on an approach that can already be seen in fair housing law. 
A. Why Shield Search? 
The idea that considerations of autonomy or “negative liberty” render 
homeseeking unreachable can be broken down into several possible claims. 
One claim might be that actors who make choices in certain capacities, such as 
“tenant,” simply act in too private a role for the state’s coercive power to 
reach. Thus, Tarunabh Khaitan observes that “duty-bearers” in 
antidiscrimination law “tend to gravitate towards the public end of the public-
private spectrum,” where a party’s claim to negative liberty is attenuated by the 
public nature of the capacity in which she acts.130 Extended broadly to the 
homeseeking context, the claim might be that selecting the neighbors one will 
 
129 See ROSE HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS 123-24 
(1969) (reporting results of a study of white real estate brokers in which significant numbers 
of respondents “hold the premise that people have the right to choose their neighbors and 
their neighborhood and that it is wrong to force people to live with neighbors they do not 
want”); Wendell E. Pritchett, Where Shall We Live? Class and the Limitations of Fair 
Housing Law, 35 URB. LAW. 399, 403 (2003) (observing that the claims of fair housing 
advocates in the period prior to the enactment of the FHA “contradicted the widely accepted 
principle that property ownership included the full right of disposal”); see also Bartlett & 
Gulati, supra note 8, at 239-41 (arguing that autonomy interests must be weighed against 
other competing interests, such as nondiscrimination, and observing that there has been 
evolution over time in how that balance is struck); Whitney, supra note 8, at 4 (critiquing 
those who “invoke ‘autonomy’ in a way that simply deploys [their] underlying 
presuppositions, instead of making those presuppositions explicit, situating them against 
reasonable rivals, and defending them”) 
130 KHAITAN, supra note 8, at 207. 
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live among is a deeply private and personal matter, implicating questions of 
privacy and association. 
Yet antidiscrimination law, as well as the Constitution, plainly withdraws 
from households the right to choose their neighbors.131 Providers of housing 
are legally constrained from delivering on consumer preferences for racially 
homogeneous residential environments.132 It is also unlawful for current 
residents to keep out would-be arrivals based on race through restrictive 
covenants,133 threats, violence, or other forms of interference.134 Nor can 
current residents band together and use the instrument of public or private 
government to restrict who may move in.135 Once one recognizes that the law 
(uncontroversially and appropriately) withdraws the right to control the racial 
composition of one’s neighbors, it becomes difficult to understand how there 
could be an autonomy right to attempt to do exactly that. And as this analysis 
makes plain, current antidiscrimination law already imposes certain duties on 
private households, negating any notion of a blanket free pass for people acting 
in the capacity of resident. 
A different form of the argument might treat the act of choosing a home as a 
special sphere of autonomy into which the law should not intrude.136 The home 
bundles together countless attributes, including surrounding amenities and 
neighbor characteristics,137 all of which may contribute to a homeseeker’s 
evaluation of the place. As a site that will be crucial to the occupants’ identity, 
the home might seem too personal and important a decision to subject to any 
 
131 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that judicial 
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(observing that if a condo association were to post a sign purporting to ban observant Jews, 
it “would undoubtedly violate [42 U.S.C.] § 3604(a)”); Seniors Civil Liberties Ass’n v. 
Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Whatever the penumbral right to privacy 
found in the Constitution might include, it excludes without question the right to dictate or 
to challenge whether families with children may move in next door to you.”).  
132 See infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text. 
133 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012). 
134 See id. §§ 3617, 3631.  
135 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (striking down racially restrictive 
zoning as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); supra note 131.  
136 Such an argument might draw on the law’s overall solicitude toward matters 
involving the home. See generally Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the 
Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (2009) (discussing and critiquing the 
ways in which law privileges the home).  
137 See, e.g., Quillian, supra note 87, at 242 (“[P]laces are actually bundles of multiple 
attributes, which matter simultaneously in how households choose destinations.”); Barton A. 
Smith, Racial Composition as a Neighborhood Amenity, in THE ECONOMICS OF URBAN 
AMENITIES 165, 188 (Douglas B. Diamond, Jr. & George S. Tolley eds., 1982) (discussing 
how “neighbor-oriented amenities” such as the race and income characteristics of a 
neighborhood’s residents factor into home prices).  
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second-guessing by government agents. And unlike stand-alone acts such as 
trying to enforce a restrictive covenant against one’s neighbor or harassing her 
based on her race, choosing a home is a complex decision that is opaque to 
outsiders.138 
A focus on opacity might seem to suggest the concern boils down to proof 
problems and the difficulty in disentangling malign from benign motivations. 
But there is another point here as well: the government’s attempt to disentangle 
motivations may itself constitute an autonomy intrusion.139 People searching 
for homes may wish to respond to subjective impressions that would later be 
difficult to articulate if called to account. Of course, landlords have made 
similar points as well—that they may wish to respond subjectively to tenants 
based on difficult-to-pinpoint aspects of their personalities. And just as we 
worry in the landlord context that those hard-to-pin-down gut feelings about a 
prospective tenant are simply prejudice,140 we might justifiably worry that 
overall subjective impressions about neighborhoods will be infected by racial 
bias.141 
Nonetheless, the burden of requiring a nondiscriminatory explanation for a 
housing choice decision seems too high. Should a family have to divulge 
details of its personal habits, sleeping arrangements, procreation plans, work 
hours, bathing schedules, and so on to a government official to explain why it 
chose the home on Mulberry Avenue and not the one on Pecan Drive? Aside 
from the prohibitive administrative costs of such an approach, inquiries of this 
sort would be unacceptably intrusive. 
This does not mean that homeseeker search behavior must be ignored 
entirely, however. The law can address search processes without controlling 
anyone’s ultimate decision. A high-profile example of this approach is “Ban 
the Box” legislation that forbids initial employment screening based on past 
convictions, while still allowing that factor to be considered in ultimate 
decisionmaking.142 But unlike Ban the Box, which may counterproductively 
 
138 Henry Smith has explored the related idea that property holdings are opaque by 
design, serving as “information hiding” modules, each of which operates like a “black box” 
as to outsiders. See Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2097, 2111-16 (2012).  
139 Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620-22 (1971) (finding unconstitutional 
entanglement between church and state in a program encompassing “the government's post-
audit power to inspect and evaluate a church-related school’s financial records and to 
determine which expenditures are religious and which are secular”).  
140 See, e.g., Marable v. H. Walker & Assocs., 644 F.2d 390, 394-96 (5th Cir. Unit B 
May 1981) (finding that the district court “failed to consider whether defendants’ rejection 
of [plaintiff’s] application for tenancy was a pretext for racial discrimination” where the 
cited reasons included refuted factual assertions and the claim that the plaintiff “got a little 
smart” during one phone call).  
141 See supra notes 53, 59 and accompanying text (citing studies showing the effect of 
racial biases on neighborhood evaluations). 
142 See JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 231-35 
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increase statistical discrimination,143 restrictions in the homeseeking arena 
could directly target race-based search heuristics. As I will suggest below, we 
already have a version of this approach within the FHA itself: the incomplete 
exemption for Mrs. Murphy landlords.144 
B. Chance Encounters and Categorical Exclusion 
For the reasons discussed above, directly policing the ultimate housing 
decisions of homeseekers is neither workable nor normatively attractive. But 
this does not mean that the homeseeker’s decision structure is unreachable. 
That structure might be modified to do two things: first, raise the costs of 
homeseeker discrimination (relative to making less biased decisions); and 
second, create environments in which learning—and associated disruptions to 
existing assumptions and patterns—might take place. Regulating aspects of the 
search environment without directly regulating the ultimate decisions that 
 
(2014) (discussing approaches that limit categorical exclusion through application questions 
or advertising but preserve ultimate decisionmaking authority); Andrew Elmore, Civil 
Disabilities in an Era of Diminishing Privacy: A Disability Approach for the Use of 
Criminal Records in Hiring, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 991, 1008-29 (2015); Kimani Paul-Emile, 
Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and Employment Discrimination in 
the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 936-39 (2014). HUD has recently issued 
guidance on the use of criminal history in decisionmaking by housing providers and housing 
transaction providers that similarly distinguishes between categorical exclusion and 
individualized determinations. HELEN R. KANOVSKY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT 
STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL 
ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS 7 (2016), 
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=hud_ogcguidappfhastandcr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6V3A-PGYZ]. 
143 See Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical 
Discrimination: A Field Experiment (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 16-012, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795795 [https://perma.cc/84RL-
7T4V]; Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-
Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes when Criminal 
Histories Are Hidden (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22469, 2016), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22469 [https://perma.cc/MRU3-CZAP]; see also LIOR JACOB 
STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 142-46 (2011); Strahilevitz, supra note 28, at 
364-75. 
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2012) (exempting from certain provisions of the FHA 
“rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied 
by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually 
maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence,” id. § 3603(b)(2), but 
leaving qualifying units subject to prohibitions on discriminatory advertisements and 
statements); infra Section II.B.1 (analyzing this incomplete exemption). A parallel 
exemption for single-family homeowners who meet certain criteria follows the same pattern 
and can be analyzed in the same way. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1). 
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homeseekers reach can be understood as a form of “choice architecture” or 
“nudge”145 that is designed to limit resort to categorical exclusion based on 
racial criteria.146 
Although it long predates the term “choice architecture,” the structure of the 
Mrs. Murphy exemption to the FHA can be viewed in just such terms, as I 
explain below. A similar combination of decisional autonomy and structured 
choice might be employed to address the tension between intimate association 
rights and the public interest in nondiscrimination in the roommate context, 
where housing provision and homeseeking often blur together. Here, I offer a 
novel alternative to the approach the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
took in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, 
LLC.147 Finally, I outline how the same conceptual approach could be applied 
to the homeseeking context more generally. 
1. Nudging Mrs. Murphy 
The FHA contains a number of limited exceptions, but none is more 
interesting and perplexing than the Mrs. Murphy exemption, which exempts 
from certain prohibitions “rooms or units in dwellings containing living 
quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families 
living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and 
occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.”148 The exemption’s 
popular name comes from the politicized specter of an elderly widow who 
must take in boarders to meet expenses.149 The arguments for exempting such 
landlords seem to track the two raised above: Mrs. Murphy plausibly has a 
greater interest in negative freedom surrounding rentals than do her 
commercial landlord counterparts, and landlords of this type might be thought 
 
145 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 3-4 (2008) (describing “choice 
architecture” and explaining how it might “nudge” behavior); Ingrid Gould Ellen, 
Supporting Integrative Choices, POVERTY & RACE, Sept./Oct. 2008, at 3, 4, 10 (invoking 
Thaler and Sunstein’s notion of the “nudge” in urging thought about how choice 
architecture around residential location decisions might be revised to promote more racial 
integration).  
146 Cf. Emens, supra note 8, at 1311 (arguing that even though intimate discrimination 
should not itself be actionable, “law should take account of its role in intimate 
discrimination at a structural level”); id. at 1366-73 (examining law’s structural role in 
intimate discrimination). 
147 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012). 
148 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2). A similarly structured provision exempts owners of single-
family residences who meet certain criteria from FHA liability for discriminatory choices in 
selling or renting the home. Id. § 3603(b)(1). Although I will focus on the Mrs. Murphy 
exception, the same analysis applies to the single-family homeowner exception, which 
likewise leaves otherwise exempt actors exposed to liability for their ads or statements. 
149 For more on the history of the Mrs. Murphy exception and its roots in debates over 
public accommodations law, see Rigel C. Oliveri, Discriminatory Housing Advertisements 
On-Line: Lessons from Craigslist, 43 IND. L. REV. 1125, 1135-38 (2010). 
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to represent such a small share of the rental market as to pose little real threat 
to housing access.150 
Section 3603(b)(2) of the FHA exempts a Mrs. Murphy landlord from 
§ 3604’s antidiscrimination provisions,151 but it does so with an important 
exception: Section 3604(c)’s prohibition on biased advertisements, notices, and 
statements remains in force, even for Mrs. Murphy.152 This combination of 
exemption and exception generates seemingly anomalous results. Mrs. Murphy 
can discriminate without fearing liability under the FHA as long as she does 
not tell the rejected tenant why she is rejecting him,153 but she can be liable if 
she is honest. Moreover, because Mrs. Murphy cannot use advertising to 
screen out tenants to whom she will not rent, she and the would-be tenants 
alike must bear higher search costs.154 These anomalies also present a potential 
constitutional issue: regulating advertising and statements beyond the scope of 
underlying illegality could raise First Amendment concerns.155 
 
150 When the FHA was enacted in 1968, Senator Walter Mondale estimated that the 
housing units qualifying for the exemption were and would remain “a very small fraction of 
the total housing supply”—at the time, approximately three percent. 114 CONG. REC. 2495, 
3424 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). Data limits make it unclear what percentage of 
the rental housing stock currently falls under the exemption. See James D. Walsh, Note, 
Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for the Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair 
Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605, 606 n.6 (1999). As of 2013, 19.04% of rental 
housing stock was in two to four unit buildings. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF 
HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR DIVERSE AND 
GROWING DEMAND 39 tbl.A-2 (2015), 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/americas_rental_housing_2015_we
b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LP2-R6LT] (providing data from which this figure was calculated). 
Although most of the rental properties containing these units are owned by individuals or 
trusts, see id. at 15 (reporting that eighty-seven percent of two to four unit buildings are 
owned by individuals or trusts), it is unclear how many of these units are in buildings in 
which the owner also resides.  
151 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2).  
152 See id. § 3603(b) (excluding § 3604(c) from the exemption). Section 3604(c) makes it 
unlawful 
[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, 
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that 
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such 
preference, limitation, or discrimination.  
Id. § 3604(c).  
153 If her discrimination is based on race or on classifications that would have counted as 
racial in 1866, however, she would still face liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. See Shaare 
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987). 
154 See Oliveri, supra note 149, at 1164-65 (noting that this inability to screen “wastes 
the time and energy of both parties”).  
155 The application of § 3604(c) to Mrs. Murphy landlords has been upheld against First 
Amendment and Due Process challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 
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A variety of explanations have been floated for the FHA’s differential 
treatment of advertisement and act, statement and sentiment.156 Of particular 
relevance here is the idea that holding Mrs. Murphy to the standard of unbiased 
advertising will alter the information environment in which she makes 
decisions, and, in the process, potentially render those decisions less biased. If 
she cannot keep away entire categories of people through her advertisements, 
she will be forced to encounter homeseekers one-on-one, on the phone, online, 
or in person. Confronting people as individuals may produce a learning effect 
that causes her to reconsider the stereotypes that she harbors.157 Even if the 
encounter is an awkward or uncomfortable one, it may carry some of the 
generative insulation-breaking power that Jerry Frug has associated with 
chance encounters in public spaces within cities.158 
 
211-15 (4th Cir. 1972). However, evolution in the commercial speech doctrine raises doubts 
about the continuing validity of such precedents. See STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 143, at 97 
(questioning whether decisions upholding advertising bans in Mrs. Murphy situations 
remain good law, given changes in the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine); see 
also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 
666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (observing in dicta, after noting that § 3603(b)(1)’s exemption for 
single-family homes permits liability for advertising, that “any rule that forbids truthful 
advertising of a transaction that would be substantively lawful encounters serious problems 
under the first amendment”). It should be noted, however, that the gap between the scope of 
§ 3604(c)’s prohibitions and the unlawfulness of the underlying conduct is much smaller 
than commonly assumed, due to 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (which bans racial discrimination in 
property transactions, without exception) and state and local laws that are more restrictive 
than the FHA. See Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): 
A New Look at the Fair Housing Act’s Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
187, 293-94 (2001) (making these points and concluding that, “[a]s a result, the modern 
‘commercial speech’ doctrine, though generous in its protection of legal and non-misleading 
messages, continues to provide a safe haven for § 3604(c) in all but the narrowest of 
circumstances”). 
156 See, e.g., STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 143, at 96-97 (discussing circuit court decisions 
that focused on the potential spillovers of Mrs. Murphy advertisements in deterring 
nonwhites from searching in a given area of the city or creating misimpressions about 
antidiscrimination law); Schwemm, supra note 155, at 223 n.162 (citing legislative history 
focusing on the damaging effects of the speech itself).  
157 Cf. EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS 67-70 
(2010) (explaining how civil rights sit-ins changed attitudes).  
158 See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (1996) 
(“[B]ig cities are a prime location in America for the experience of otherness: They put 
people in contact, whether they like it or not, with men and women who have values, 
opinions, or desires that they find unfamiliar, strange, even offensive.”); see also Dawkins, 
supra note 91, at 389 (describing “the contact hypothesis, which states that interracial 
prejudices decline as groups gain familiarity with each other and come into contact with 
each other more often in social situations” (citing GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF 
PREJUDICE (1954)).  
  
2017] SEARCHING FOR FAIR HOUSING 385 
 
Thus, the FHA will not second-guess the choices that Mrs. Murphy 
ultimately makes among potential tenants, but it will not allow her to screen 
people out categorically based on their group status. Nor will the FHA allow 
her to turn them away with an overt statement about that status; she need not 
be particularly polite, but she must find a way to interact with them without 
mentioning their group status as a reason for her refusal to deal. The FHA thus 
mandates that she make any discriminatory choices on a retail rather than 
wholesale basis, within a facially neutral search process. 
To be sure, there are unanswered empirical questions about how well this 
setup works to change behavior, as well as normative questions about any 
system that raises search costs—often quite asymmetrically—for homeseekers 
as well as for Mrs. Murphy landlords.159 My aim here is not to take a position 
on the qualified Mrs. Murphy exception, but rather to point out how it works to 
structure the search environment while at the same time recognizing a realm of 
decisional freedom. As I will show, a similar approach could be extended to 
homeseeking, an arena where heightened search costs would largely be borne 
by the discriminator. 
2. Reining in Roommates 
One of the most interesting recent questions in fair housing law surrounds 
whether and how the prohibitions on discriminatory housing choice apply to 
roommates who are sharing a residence. This issue reads on questions of 
housing search both by analogy and in the following more direct sense: 
roommate matching is often undertaken reciprocally in ways that blur 
traditional lines between housing providers and housing consumers. 
In Roommate.com, the Ninth Circuit held that shared living situations lie 
entirely outside of the purview of the FHA, based on its reading of the word 
“dwelling.”160 The court’s interpretation drew heavily on what it took to be the 
assumptions of Congress at the time of the FHA’s enactment, as well as on the 
canon of constitutional avoidance—triggered in this case by concerns about the 
intimate association rights implicated in roommate choices.161 Throughout the 
lively majority opinion, Chief Judge Kozinski recounted myriad ways in which 
roommates might find themselves incompatible or just uncomfortable with 
roommates of a different sex or religion, from the fear of being seen in a towel 
while in transit from the shower,162 to discovering foods in the refrigerator that 
violate one’s religious restrictions.163 
 
159 Mrs. Murphy can turn away a prospective tenant after a single glance, whereas that 
would-be tenant may have invested considerable time and money to come view the 
apartment.  
160 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 
1219-22 (9th Cir. 2012). 
161 See id. 
162 Id. at 1221 (“[A] girl may not want to walk around in her towel in front of a boy.”).  
163 Id. (“An orthodox Jew may want a roommate with similar beliefs and dietary 
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Significantly, the court’s approach read shared living situations out of the 
FHA entirely—a result that not only keeps people from being forced into 
housing relationships that offend their beliefs or their modesty, but that also 
legalizes facially discriminatory roommate ads, such as for “whites only” 
group houses.164 There is another way of interpreting the statutory text in the 
roommate context, however—one that would address the court’s concerns 
about intimate association without resorting to a strained reading of “dwelling” 
that places roommates entirely outside the law.165 It is animated by the same 
general principle discussed in the Mrs. Murphy context: preserving a sphere of 
decisional autonomy while structuring the search environment to permit the 
learning that can come from chance encounters with individual people.166 
Textually, this alternative would read the prohibitions in § 3604 to extend a 
conclusive presumption that individual roommate selections are not “because 
of” protected status if they are made in accordance with required search 
protocols.167 These search protocols would incorporate the bans on statements 
and advertisements in § 3604(c), potentially modified to fit the roommate 
context. For example, roommate ads for residents of the same sex or for co-
religionists might be justified on the grounds that there are valid, 
nondiscriminatory reasons (modesty or religious observance) for categorically 
limiting one’s search along these dimensions.168 But with respect to protected 
 
restrictions, so he won’t have to worry about finding honey-baked ham in the refrigerator 
next to the potato latkes.”).  
164 I thank Eduardo Peñalver and Michael Schill for discussions on this point and on 
other aspects of the Roommate.com decision.  
165 The FHA defines “dwelling” as “any building, structure, or portion thereof which is 
occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, 
and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location 
thereon of any such building, structure, or portion thereof.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (2012) 
(emphasis added). For a critique of the Ninth Circuit’s failure in Roommate.com to 
distinguish among different kinds of shared living arrangements based on structural features 
and capacity to achieve privacy (e.g., through locks on doors and separate bedrooms), see 
Tim Iglesias, Does Fair Housing Law Apply to “Shared Living Situations”? Or the Trouble 
with Roommates, 22 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 111, 124-26 (2014). 
166 See Oliveri, supra note 149, at 1170 & n.233 (discussing this point, which she 
attributes to Eduardo Peñalver). 
167 For a different proposed alternative, see Iglesias, supra note 165, at 144-46, which 
argues for varying treatment of roommate advertising depending on where and how the 
advertising occurred. 
168 An analogy might be drawn to Title VII’s “bona fide occupational qualification” 
defense, which allows employers to select employees based on religion, sex, or national 
origin (but not race) where doing so is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012). Such a selectively 
categorical approach may be implicit in HUD’s longstanding recognition of an exception to 
§ 3604(c) for sex, but not other protected statuses, when the advertising is for shared living 
arrangements. See Memorandum from Roberta Achtenberg, Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. 
& Equal Opportunity, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to Fair Hous. & Equal 
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characteristics for which no plausible categorical intimate association interest 
for roommates exists, such as race,169 the ban on discriminatory ads would 
remain in force. This approach would push roommates to select or reject each 
other as individuals rather than categorically based on group status alone—
while at the same time protecting their ultimate selections from scrutiny.170 
3. The Homeseeker’s Search 
In both of the situations above, suppressing discriminatory signals could 
hold value even if there were no effort to regulate bias in ultimate housing 
decisions. The value stems from two sources. First, restricting discriminatory 
signals raises the cost of exclusion by requiring would-be discriminators to 
deal directly with individuals rather than categorically screening them out. 
Second, bringing such parties into direct contact with individuals possessing 
protected characteristics may produce a learning effect. 
We come now to the question of homeseeker search heuristics. Here too, it 
would be feasible to harmonize an interest in decisional privacy and autonomy 
with principles of nondiscrimination by regulating the search environment 
while applying a conclusive presumption that decisions reached within that 
search environment are nondiscriminatory in nature. As in the prior examples, 
search protocols could be adjusted to raise the costs of discrimination, preserve 
the potential for learning through chance encounters, and prevent people from 
engaging in categorical exclusions based on group membership. In the next 
Part, I will consider some ways that such structuring might proceed. 
As I will explain, existing law can potentially reach homeseekers who use 
discriminatory advertising or statements or employ others (including apps and 
websites) to carry out biased searches. Unlike in the situations above, the 
 
Opportunity Dirs. et al., Guidance Regarding Advertisements Under § 804(c) of the Fair 
Housing Act (Jan. 9, 1995), at 2 (“Intake staff should not accept a complaint against a 
newspaper for running an advertisement which includes the phrase female roommate 
wanted because the advertisement does not indicate whether the requirements for the shared 
living exception have been met.”). This exception was previously codified. See 24 C.F.R. § 
109.20(b)(5) (1988). Part 109 was subsequently withdrawn by HUD, but the withdrawal 
was accompanied by a statement that the Part contained “nonbinding guidance” that was 
“very helpful to HUD clients” and that would thenceforth be provided in handbook or other 
guidance formats rather than in the Code of Federal Regulations. Regulatory Reinvention; 
Streamlining of HUD’s Regulations Implementing the Fair Housing Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 
14,378 (Apr. 1, 1996).  
169 Cf. Soules v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(finding that a landlord’s question about children in the household did not necessarily 
violate the FHA because there could be a valid purpose for asking, but suggesting there 
would never be a valid reason for asking about race).  
170 But see Oliveri, supra note 149, at 1170-71 (considering and rejecting an approach 
that would retain an advertising ban for roommates, in part because it would raise the costs 
to minority roommate-seekers in locating housemates of the same race, ethnicity, or 
nationality).  
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dampening of informational signals in the homeseeking context primarily 
places costs on the party who is seeking to discriminate—here, the 
homeseeker. Sellers and landlords may be inconvenienced to some degree by 
showing homes to homeseekers who have engaged in less comprehensive 
prescreening based on their own biases, if those biases prove intractable. 
Nonetheless, those housing providers will also gain the potential capacity to 
complete some transactions that would not otherwise occur. And, importantly, 
the homeseeker cannot impose costs on others without imposing equal or 
larger costs on herself by actually going to look at the places in question. 
Before turning to specific doctrinal vehicles for achieving this result, it is 
important to emphasize a point that this Article’s focus on white avoidance has 
muted: the normative analysis above and the doctrinal points below would 
apply regardless of the race of the homeseeker pursuing a segregative racial 
preference. As a result, strategies designed to address white avoidance may run 
counter to deeply held preferences of some minority households. In assessing 
this concern, it is important to recognize the mild and contingent nature of 
many minority preferences for same-race neighbors,171 and the related 
possibility that lower levels of society-wide segregation would alter the nature 
of race-based preferences across all groups. Nonetheless, one cannot escape 
the possibility that altering search protocols could interfere with some minority 
homeseeking preferences. 
Although this possibility does complicate the normative picture,172 the large 
and asymmetric harms that residential segregation visits on minority 
households must also be kept in mind. There is in fact no way to pursue the 
FHA’s goal of integration without making a value judgment against 
segregationist preferences, even those held by African American 
households.173 This does not mean anyone’s ultimate choice about where to 
 
171 See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.  
172 See, e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra note 3, at 1000 (explaining that “seeking to hold white 
people liable for their own housing choices” would be “untenable for a variety of reasons, 
not the least of which is that . . . we would also have to hold blacks liable for their own 
housing choices to the extent that those choices perpetuated segregation”); cf. Oliveri, supra 
note 149, at 1170-71.  
173 The discussion in the text assumes that symmetrical treatment of race-based 
homeseeking by whites and blacks would be required. For recent analyses of the symmetry 
principle in antidiscrimination law, see generally Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for 
Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law, 2017 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2837737 [https://perma.cc/6AZY-
KUP7]; Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 305, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2837939 [https://perma.cc/TE7D-
V7LL]. The fact that white avoidance systematically does more societal harm than other 
forms of self-segregation, however, might supply a neutral reason for setting enforcement 
priorities. Moreover, certain kinds of symmetrical treatments would interfere substantially 
less with minority homeseeking preferences than with white homeseeking preferences. See 
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live will be withdrawn, only that the law is not neutral on the issue of housing 
patterns. Just as the law already limits what sellers, landlords, and realtors can 
do to maintain a neighborhood’s current racial composition—whatever it may 
be174—the law can also take steps to influence and regulate the search 
environment. 
III. ADDRESSING HOMESEEKING THROUGH LAW 
Although the question is rarely analyzed in any depth, it is widely assumed 
that existing law does not reach discriminatory homeseeking. This Part 
challenges that assumption. Viable doctrinal avenues—albeit wholly 
unrecognized ones—already exist for reaching aspects of homeseeking in a 
manner consistent with the normative considerations and constraints developed 
in Parts I and II of this Article. 
This Part begins by questioning the assumption that housing choices made 
for racially biased reasons are, as commentators are wont to put it, “perfectly 
legal.”175 Although the FHA probably does not make it unlawful for 
homeseekers to discriminate based on race in their home selection decisions, 
§ 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 almost certainly does.176 However, for a 
number of reasons, § 1982 does not offer an especially useful or attractive 
stand-alone vehicle for reaching homeseeking. Nonetheless, § 1982 buttresses 
(and saves from a key criticism) the use of other provisions within the FHA, 
including the prohibition on discriminatory advertisements and statements, to 
reach certain collateral actions undertaken by homeseekers or by those 
assisting them in the course of conducting a housing search. As I show, this 
approach is fully consistent with both the text and purpose of the FHA. 
 
infra note 276 and accompanying text (providing the example of prohibiting search tools 
that filter neighborhoods based on whether one’s own race constitutes a majority or super-
majority in that neighborhood). I thank Noah Zatz for this point. Self-segregation on 
religious grounds implicates additional constitutional interests that I do not delve into in this 
Article.  
174 For example, existing interpretations of antidiscrimination law would prohibit a 
homeseller from favoring a black buyer over a white one in an effort to maintain a 
neighborhood’s character—despite the deeply felt sense of neighborhood identity that might 
prompt such conduct. See Bellafante, supra note 119 (relating an instance in which such 
concerns may have factored into a seller’s decision). Even if such a seller were exempt 
under § 3603(b)(1) of the FHA, which would depend on a variety of factors, § 1982’s ban 
on intentional racial discrimination in property transactions would reach the conduct if it 
were indeed based on race. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-
96 (1976) (reading parallel statutory language in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to reach discrimination 
against whites).  
175 See supra note 3. 
176 See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012). 
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A. The Househunter’s (Legal) Prerogative? 
One can fairly conclude that the “housing refusal” prohibition in § 3604(a) 
of the FHA177 does not outlaw a homeseeker’s racially biased housing choice. 
That provision makes it illegal “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a 
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise 
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race [or another 
protected status].”178 Anyone who purchases or rents a home can, in some 
sense, be said to have made that dwelling unavailable to everyone else.179 But 
in the typical case, a biased homeseeker does not make a particular dwelling 
unavailable to anyone because of race; rather, she makes it unavailable to 
everyone regardless of race.180 
The cumulative effect of homeseeker choices may indeed be to make 
dwellings unavailable because of race, whether through price effects or 
otherwise. Similarly, by participating in biased housing choices that entrench 
segregation, a homeseeker might be said to have contributed to making a 
particular sort of dwelling—one situated in an integrated neighborhood—
unavailable because of race.181 Yet no homeseeker produces such results 
alone.182 If the prohibitions on discriminatory decisionmaking in the FHA were 
 
177 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012). 
178 Id. 
179 See Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 345 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(“If we are able to purchase a house because we can offer more money, we have in one 
sense ‘denied’ it to everyone else.”). The Babin court went on to firmly reject the idea that 
denial in this sense amounted to denial within the meaning of the FHA. See id.  
180 There have in fact been some cases involving purchases motivated by the desire to 
deprive protected group members of the opportunity to buy or occupy a dwelling. In Babin, 
the Sixth Circuit held that even a purchase motivated by a desire to keep out members of a 
protected group presents no cognizable FHA violation, see id., though at least two 
subsequent federal district court opinions have declined to follow Babin’s lead. See Step-
By-Step, Inc. v. Lazarus, No. Civ. 97-1006, 1997 WL 853508, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 
1997) (finding that the FHA “does apply to a buyer who purchases a property with the 
intention of preventing the purchase by an entity planning to use the property as a Group 
Home for members protected under the Act”); United States v. Hughes, 849 F. Supp. 685, 
686 (D. Neb. 1994) (denying motion to dismiss where a bank financed a purchase allegedly 
undertaken for the purpose of preventing the property’s purchase for a group home for 
mentally disabled adults). But situations involving exclusionary motives for purchase are, 
one would hope, rare outliers. 
181 If a dwelling is understood not just as a structure but also as a bundle of attributes that 
incorporates effects from outside the property boundaries, then segregation effectively 
withdraws one dwelling type (a home in an integrated neighborhood) from the market and 
replaces it with a very different one (a home in a segregated neighborhood). See generally 
LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES 
(2009) (examining the implications of a broad conceptualization of the home that 
encompasses off-parcel amenities and effects).  
182 Cf. Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1531 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[The FHA] 
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the only ones in play, the conclusion that homeseeking is doctrinally 
unreachable would be a sensible one. 
But there is another path to homeseeker liability: Section 1982 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. Although often upstaged by the FHA, § 1982 remains a 
powerful part of the antidiscrimination arsenal. Unlike the FHA, it does not 
contain any exceptions. It covers both private and governmental 
discrimination.183 And it is squarely directed at racial discrimination.184 The 
provision reads in full as follows: “All citizens of the United States shall have 
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens 
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property.”185 
What is most notable about § 1982 for present purposes is that the rights it 
grants run not only to the various means of obtaining property (inherit, 
purchase, lease) but also to means of disposing of property (sell, convey). 
Homeseekers are not just choosing where to live, they are also choosing from 
whom they will and will not buy or lease. And § 1982 seems to make 
discriminatory purchase decisions just as actionable as discriminatory sales 
decisions.186 It is hard to see how § 1982 would fail to apply, for example, to a 
buyer who rejects an otherwise acceptable home sale transaction solely 
because of the race of the seller. 
It is not as obvious, however, that § 1982 provides a useful tool for 
addressing choices to rule out entire areas based on their racial composition. 
Choosing to buy a home in an all-white neighborhood greatly increases the 
odds of buying from a white seller, and is thus likely to deprive a seller of a 
different race of a sales transaction. But this outcome might seem to be merely 
an incidental by-product of the neighborhood choice.187 Even a househunter 
who is using explicitly racial criteria to choose a neighborhood may be 
perfectly willing to purchase from a seller of a different race; one might 
imagine that she primarily cares about the race of her would-be neighbors, not 
the racial identity of her grantor. There are a couple of responses to this point. 
 
does not impose liability . . . for failing to coordinate individual integrative acts that have an 
aggregate resegregative effect.”). 
183 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (“We hold that § 1982 bars 
all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property . . . .”). 
184 Section 1982 has also been interpreted to reach classifications that would have been 
thought of as race-based at the time of its enactment, and hence extends to discrimination 
based on national origin, ethnicity, and religion. See, e.g., Shaare Tefila Congregation v. 
Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987). 
185 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).  
186 I thank Noah Zatz for discussions on this point.  
187 That § 1982 presumably reaches only intentional discrimination sharpens this point. 
The Supreme Court has limited the reach of parallel language in § 1981 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 to intentional discrimination, using reasoning that strongly suggests both 
provisions would be treated alike. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 
U.S. 375, 382-91 (1982). 
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First, there is empirical evidence that the race of the seller or current 
occupant of a housing unit does matter to homeseekers, whether as part of the 
search heuristic or as an independent basis of discrimination.188 Analysis of 
data from 1989 to 1993 uncovered a surprising reluctance of white households 
to move into housing units that had been vacated by black households—a 
reluctance that appeared insensitive to numerous other factors about the 
dwelling unit and the neighborhood in which it was located.189 Although those 
data are now dated, the findings suggest that African American owner-
occupants may be losing home sales based on their own racial identity, as 
distinct from the neighborhood’s overall racial trends.190 More recent work, 
considered in conjunction with newer data on unit turnover,191 is consistent 
with this interpretation. Respondents in a 2010 San Francisco Bay Area study 
who viewed images of the same home rated it less favorably if the sellers were 
depicted as a black family rather than a similarly configured and attired white 
family.192 Also suggestive is a 2014 working paper finding that black landlords 
offering spaces on Airbnb receive lower rents than nonblack landlords.193 
 
188 See ELLEN, supra note 6, at 140 (“To some extent, the race of the previous occupant 
may be viewed as a clear proxy for the racial composition of the neighborhood. . . . But it is 
possible that the race of the departing occupant signifies something in itself . . . .”); John R. 
Hipp, Segregation Through the Lens of Housing Unit Transition: What Roles Do the Prior 
Residents, the Local Micro-Neighborhood, and the Broader Neighborhood Play?, 49 
DEMOGRAPHY 1285, 1287 (2012) (hypothesizing “that prospective residents use the 
race/ethnicity of the current residents in the unit as a signal that the neighborhood is 
appropriate for someone of their own race/ethnicity”). 
189 Specifically, white in-moving rates into black-vacated units appeared unaffected by 
“the growth in the black population over the previous decade.” ELLEN, supra note 6, at 150; 
see also Hipp, supra note 188, at 1289-1304 (using a data set that followed turnover in 
housing units between 1985 and 1989 and between 1989 and 1993 to break apart the effect 
of the race of the previous occupant from the racial composition of the immediately 
surrounding “micro-neighborhood” as well as that of the larger neighborhood, while 
controlling for numerous other factors). John Hipp’s study found that “the race/ethnicity of 
the prior residents had a strong effect on the race/ethnicity of the new residents” and that 
this effect was observed “even when accounting for the racial/ethnic composition of the 
micro-neighborhood and the broader tract.” Id. at 1302.  
190 ELLEN, supra note 6, at 150 (describing the findings and concluding that “[t]he key 
implication is that whites appear unwilling to enter black-vacated units, and few 
circumstances seem to change their minds”). 
191 See Brett Theodos, Claudia J. Coulton & Rob Pitingolo, Housing Unit Turnover and 
the Socioeconomic Mix of Low-Income Neighborhoods, 660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 117 (2015) (examining unit turnover reflected between three waves of data 
covering 2002-03, 2005-06, and 2008-09). The primary focus of this work was stickiness in 
poverty status among successive occupants of the same units, of which the authors found 
substantial evidence, but they also observed that “poverty status is more apt to change than 
is race/ethnicity of the occupants.” Id. at 125. 
192 Courtney Marie Bonam, Devaluing Black Space: Black Locations as Targets of 
Housing and Environmental Discrimination 34-46, apps. C & D (August 2010) 
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Second, even if the buyer’s discrimination were directed solely at the 
neighbors of the seller, and not at the seller herself, the seller still loses a sale 
due to intentional racial discrimination. Where the seller is of the same race as 
the parties discriminated against, it seems a bit artificial to absolve the buyer of 
liability on the ground that she only meant to discriminate against the 
neighbors. The idea of “transferred intent” in tort law provides a useful 
analogy: a defendant cannot escape liability for the intentional tort of battery 
by asserting that he meant to batter a different person instead.194 If African 
American homesellers are losing sales because white homebuyers are avoiding 
their neighborhoods based on the race of the residents, those sellers are being 
deprived of equal chances to transact over property based on their race. This 
conclusion seems especially compelling where past discrimination makes it 
very likely that African American homesellers will be selling homes within 
predominantly African American neighborhoods. 
A 1973 Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decision, Clark v. 
Universal Builders, Inc.,195 embraced an analogously broad reading of § 
1982.196 There, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants exploited a “dual 
housing market” by selling homes in African American neighborhoods for 
higher prices and on less favorable terms than comparable homes in white 
areas.197 The defendants contended that they did not violate § 1982 because 
they did not offer different terms to buyers of different races for the same 
homes.198 But the Seventh Circuit found it an unrealistic dodge for defendants 
 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University), 
https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:gz102cb9731/Bonam_Dissertation-augmented.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7274-YCHG]; see also Michelle Wilde Anderson & Victoria C. Plaut, 
Property Law: Implicit Bias and the Resilience of Spatial Colorlines, in IMPLICIT RACIAL 
BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 25, 34-36 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) 
(discussing this study and other work by Courtney Marie Bonam and her colleagues). Even 
when prior residents do not directly interact with potential in-movers, they typically have an 
opportunity to view the housing unit, where “many possible clues might tip them off about 
the race/ethnicity of the current owners”—including family photos displayed in the home. 
Hipp, supra note 188, at 1288. 
193 See Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of 
Airbnb.com (Harvard Bus. Sch. Negotiation, Orgs. & Mkts. Unit, Working Paper No. 14-
054, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377353 [https://perma.cc/2FYZ-F7YH] (finding racial 
discrimination against Airbnb landlords, with equivalent rentals from a nonblack host 
commanding twelve percent higher rents on average). 
194 See, e.g., Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397, 399-400 (Okla. 1958). See generally Kerri 
Lynn Stone, Ricci Glitch? The Unexpected Appearance of Transferred Intent in Title VII, 55 
LOY. L. REV. 751 (2009) (discussing the possible application of a transferred intent theory to 
Title VII and noting some potential parallels in FHA jurisprudence). 
195 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1973) (Clark I). 
196 Id. at 328-34. 
197 Id. at 327, 334. 
198 Id. at 329-31. 
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to assert “that they would have sold on the same terms to those whites who 
elected to enter the black market and to purchase housing in the ghetto and 
segregated inner-city neighborhoods at exorbitant prices, far in excess of prices 
for comparable homes in the white market.”199 Similar skepticism might attach 
to a househunter’s assertion that she would be perfectly willing to purchase 
from any black homeseller that she happened to encounter within an otherwise 
all-white neighborhood. 
Many hurdles to employing this approach remain, however. If African 
American sellers are avoided en masse through neighborhood choice rather 
than one at a time, there may be no identifiable victim of discrimination. Even 
if this obstacle can be surmounted through organizational standing or standing 
premised on the injuries of segregation, pinpointing the behavior that caused 
these injuries remains problematic.200 Data may establish that white buyers are 
failing to buy from black sellers at rates that are higher than can be explained 
through other factors, but there may be no way to determine which specific 
transactions featured discrimination.201 
Nonetheless, the discussion above suggests that § 1982 would be available 
in instances where proof of discriminatory intent is available—for example, 
where a homeseeker is found to have rejected a prospective seller or landlord 
 
199 Id. at 331. On appeal after remand, the Seventh Circuit upheld a judgment for the 
defendant based, inter alia, on the district court’s findings that the homes in question 
(located, respectively, in suburban Deerfield, Illinois, and on Chicago’s South Side) were 
not in fact comparable and that plaintiffs had failed to explain how defendants could have 
charged excessive prices in a market that appeared to be a competitive one. Clark v. 
Universal Builders, Inc. (Clark II), 706 F.2d 204, 208-12 (7th Cir. 1983). Nonetheless, 
Clark I’s insistence on taking a realistic view of the ways in which discrimination has 
shaped the landscape that actors encounter, when coupled with § 1982’s embrace of both 
sides of property transactions, could provide a potential doctrinal hook for reaching 
discriminatory homeseeking. Cf. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968) (“In the 
context of the state-imposed segregated pattern of long standing, the fact that in 1965 the 
Board opened the doors of the former ‘white’ school to Negro children and of the ‘Negro’ 
school to white children merely begins, not ends, our inquiry whether the Board has taken 
steps adequate to abolish its dual, segregated system.”).  
200 Organizational standing is permitted in FHA cases, but lower courts are divided on 
whether it is available in § 1982 cases. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING 
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 27:17 (2016). Questions concerning standing in 
the FHA context, including the issue of causation, are currently pending review before the 
Supreme Court. See City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 801 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2015) 
and City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. granted and 
cases consolidated, 136 S. Ct. 2544 (2016) and 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016).  
201 Disparate impact analysis is often capable of reaching practices that statistically cause 
status-related harm, even when it is impossible to identify the particular cases in which 
status produced the result. See generally Zatz, supra note 122. But this approach only works 
when there is some party producing aggregate results through a practice or policy, not when 
many individuals are separately making their own decisions, only some of which involve 
discrimination.  
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based on race. Evidence of such discriminatory intent might be found in some 
of the same places that one might look for violations of the FHA: in 
advertising, statements, and interactions with realtors.202 
B. Reaching Collateral Search Conduct 
The discussion above suggests that the FHA contains no clear way to reach 
the actual decisions of biased homeseekers as a conceptual matter, while 
§ 1982 offers a conceptual path that may be largely unavailable for practical or 
evidentiary reasons. But might the two be combined in some manner? One 
possibility has already been mentioned: that certain collateral acts regulated by 
the FHA—advertising, statements, and assisted search—could constitute 
evidence of a homeseeker’s § 1982 violation. But the fact that § 1982 reaches 
biased homeseeking can also be used to buttress direct liability for collateral 
search behavior under the FHA itself. 
As I explain below, the FHA can be fairly read to reach certain forms of 
collateral search conduct. To be sure, the law has not previously been read in 
this way;203 indeed, HUD has made some contrary interpretative moves.204 But 
those interpretations, I posit, were likely driven by constitutional or conceptual 
concerns with reading the FHA to reach collateral conduct relating to legal 
underlying acts.205 They may also have been supported by an assumption that 
the biased decisions of buyers and tenants can have no real effect on fair 
housing. Both the practical effect of biased homeseeking behavior and the 
legal status of the underlying conduct must be rethought in light of the analysis 
above.206 There is no doctrinal impediment to reaching collateral or assistive 
acts that abet discrimination that is both illegal and harmful. 
Homeseekers are typically viewed as outside the FHA’s ambit because they 
are not thought to be erecting or policing any barriers to housing access; they 
are merely trying to navigate them. Yet the “barriers” metaphor misleadingly 
treats the set of housing opportunities as exogenously given, as if we need only 
make actors step out of the way or remove race-based filters from their 
doorsteps. Where the housing choice set is constrained by discriminatory 
homeseeking heuristics, those heuristics become barriers that are no less real 
than those erected by housing providers. Achieving the integrative purpose of 
 
202 Cf. Schwemm, supra note 155, at 251-55 (discussing the evidentiary use of 
discriminatory statements in establishing violations of other sections of the FHA).  
203 I am not aware of any court interpreting the law in this way, nor have I seen any 
scholarly support for such an interpretation. See, e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra note 3, at 1002-
03 (rejecting the possibility that § 3604(c) could apply to housing consumers, asserting that 
it, like § 3604(d), “do[es] not contemplate third parties”).  
204 See infra Sections III.C & III.D.  
205 As noted above, there might be First Amendment concerns with regulating speech 
beyond the ambit of substantive prohibitions—but these concerns would not apply when the 
underlying conduct is illegal. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra Part I & Section III.A.  
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the FHA, recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court,207 requires attention to 
both demand-side and supply-side impediments to that goal. 
C. Advertising and Statements 
Section 3604(c) of the FHA makes it illegal “[t]o make, print, or publish, or 
cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or 
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any 
preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race [or other protected 
status], or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or 
discrimination.”208 The limiting language—“with respect to the sale or rental 
of a dwelling”—has been interpreted to rule out ‘“stray’ racial remark[s]” or 
social commentary about living patterns.209 But nothing in the advertising and 
statement prohibition specifies on which side of a transaction the speaker or 
advertiser must stand. Thus, homeseekers who state preferences based on race 
in connection with buying or renting a dwelling seem to fall under the literal 
language of § 3604(c), just as sellers and landlords plainly do. 
It does not appear, however, that HUD or the courts have read § 3604(c) to 
reach homeseeker communications. HUD’s regulation on advertising and 
statements repeats the statutory prohibitions and then adds the following 
proviso: “The prohibitions in this section shall apply to all written or oral 
notices or statements by a person engaged in the sale or rental of a 
dwelling.”210 Purchasers and tenants are arguably “engaged” in a sale or rental 
of a dwelling when they negotiate or sign a contract or lease, but the language 
fits them less well than supply-side housing providers. Moreover, the next 
section of the regulation, although expressly nonexhaustive, provides examples 
that seem to focus on supply-side discrimination.211 
HUD also produced a letter and memorandum in the mid-1990s indicating 
that ads in which homeseekers describe their own characteristics would not be 
reachable by the FHA.212 Notably, such self-describing ads, when engaged in 
 
207 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2525-26 (2015).  
208 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012). 
209 See Schwemm, supra note 155, at 215 (citing Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1055 
(9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., Inc., 474 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 
(5th Cir. 1973)). 
210 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(b) (2016) (emphasis added). 
211 See id. § 100.75(c). 
212 See Letter from Nelson Diaz, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to 
Rene Milam, Assistant Gen. Counsel & Dir. of Legal Affairs, Newspaper Ass’n of Am., 
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_
advmemo [https://perma.cc/2QE4-FEWS] [hereinafter Diaz Letter] (opining that ads in 
which homeseekers describe themselves along protected dimensions did not violate the 
Act); Memorandum from Sara Pratt, Dir. of Investigations, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., to Reg’l Dirs. et al., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (July 25, 1995), 
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_
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by housing providers, have been held to violate § 3604(c). For example, a 
landlord’s advertisement of a unit for rent in a “white home” was found to 
communicate the landlord’s racial preference in tenants to an ordinary 
reader.213 Likewise, tenants and buyers who describe their own characteristics 
are plausibly signaling preferences for those characteristics in landlords, 
sellers, or neighbors. 
Alternatively, a tenant or buyer might express a “limitation” based on 
protected status within the meaning of § 3604(c) simply by representing to 
sellers or landlords that the proposed transaction will be with a person whose 
characteristics match the specified ones—thereby facilitating discrimination by 
housing providers.214 Interestingly, HUD issued its guidance despite expressly 
recognizing this risk.215 Such self-describing ads, if sufficiently prevalent, 
could allow landlords to fill their units with those who match their preferred 
profiles without ever having to run a discriminatory ad or turn away people 
who show up to look at the unit. 
These concerns have only been sharpened by the ways in which technology 
has altered the process for matching up homeseekers and homes. The one-to-
many model of communication exemplified by the print newspaper ad has 
been supplanted by the many-to-many communications that the internet now 
facilitates—ones in which buyers and tenants as well as sellers and landlords 
can initiate housing matches. Those seeking housing can at trivial cost post 
information about their own characteristics or the characteristics that they seek 
in landlords, neighbors, or housemates. Reaching these ads and statements is a 
move that is well supported by the FHA’s text and purpose. 
D. Assisted Search: Agents and Apps 
Homeseekers often receive assistance from others in carrying out searches. 
In this Section, I will consider two forms of assistive technologies: (1) the 
employment of real estate professionals; and (2) the use of apps or other online 
interfaces to structure search. In both cases, I will consider the potential 
liability of the homeseeker making use of such assistance to carry out biased 
searches, as well as the possible liability of the provider of such assistance (the 
real estate agent, app creator, or website provider). As in the case of 
advertisements and statements, the prohibitions contained in § 1982 help to 
buttress causes of action that relate to these sorts of assisted search.216 Where 
the underlying conduct is illegal, it makes little sense to exempt actions 
 
advmemo [https://perma.cc/2QE4-FEWS] (stating this conclusion and promising future 
guidance on the issue). The additional guidance promised in the Pratt memo does not appear 
to have materialized. 
213 See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972). 
214 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
215 See Diaz Letter, supra note 212. 
216 See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).  
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directed at abetting it, if those actions otherwise fall within the coverage of the 
FHA’s text and would undermine its purposes if left unchecked. 
1. Real Estate Professionals 
Consider first the possibility that homeseekers could incur liability based on 
biased statements or instructions given to real estate agents. Significantly, 
§ 3604(c) has been interpreted to apply to both oral and written statements 
“with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.”217 If that prohibition were 
read to reach homeseeker communications, it could reach statements made to 
real estate agents, including a request to exclude homes from consideration 
based on racial criteria. Such a statement would fall within the textual 
prohibition because it “indicates [a] preference, limitation or discrimination 
based on race” if it is sufficiently targeted to constitute a statement made “with 
respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.”218 
Significantly, HUD’s regulation on discriminatory ads and statements 
explicitly prohibits “[e]xpressing to agents, brokers, employees, prospective 
sellers or renters or any other persons a preference for or limitation on any 
purchaser or renter because of race [or other protected status].”219 While this 
provision addresses discrimination against purchasers and renters, not sellers 
or landlords, it nonetheless shows that instructions to a realtor represent the 
kinds of statements that can, in HUD’s view, run afoul of the FHA. Under the 
analysis in the preceding section, there is no textual, constitutional, or purpose-
based reason for the law to treat homeseekers any differently under § 3604(c) 
than landlords and sellers are already treated.220 
 
217 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c); 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(b) (2016) (“The prohibitions in this section 
shall apply to all written or oral notices or statements by a person engaged in the sale or 
rental of a dwelling.”). Courts have read the statutory prohibition in a similarly broad 
fashion. See, e.g., Jancik v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 44 F.3d 553, 556-57 (7th Cir. 
1995) (finding that a landlord’s comments and questions about race and family status, made 
over the phone to prospective tenants, violated § 3604(c)). 
218 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). Much of what homeseekers say about their prospective searches 
would likely fall beyond the narrow confines of “with respect to the sale or rental of a 
dwelling.” See, e.g., Schwemm, supra note 155, at 215 (citing cases in which § 3604(c) was 
found inapplicable because the statements in question were not tied to a specific transaction 
involving a dwelling). But some very targeted comments and instructions to realtors could 
be related tightly enough to the sale or rental of a dwelling to potentially generate liability. 
219 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(c)(2). 
220 The issue of enforcement remains, though the difficulty is not unique to homeseeker 
statements; it is just as hard to imagine how the prohibition on discriminatory statements 
that sellers or landlords make to agents could be enforced. Even if enforcement were wholly 
absent, however, making the conduct illegal could carry significant expressive force that 
might prove valuable in changing search norms. See infra note 259 and accompanying text. 
The underlying illegality of the discriminatory instructions would also rule out a defense for 
real estate agents who follow such instructions—that they are merely satisfying the entirely 
legal preferences of a housing customer. See infra notes 222-38 and accompanying text. 
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Consider next the potential liability of real estate professionals who solicit 
or follow race-based househunting instructions. Real estate agents are covered 
by the general prohibitions on discrimination found in § 3604 of the FHA, 
including § 3604(a), and thus may not “otherwise make unavailable or deny[] a 
dwelling.”221 This language plainly reaches racial steering, in which a real 
estate agent selectively chooses properties to show based on the race of her 
clients, even if her actions are based on her own assumptions (accurate or not) 
about their preferences for neighborhood racial composition.222 But what if the 
client actually expresses a preference and the agent merely carries it out, so 
that the agent cannot be said to have made any dwelling unavailable to that 
client? Here, it becomes relevant that § 3605(a) separately provides: 
 It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business 
includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to 
discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or 
in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.223 
Section 3605(b) defines “residential real estate-related transaction[s]” to 
include not only loans and other financial transactions related to real estate, but 
also “[t]he selling, brokering, or appraising of residential real property.”224 
Although § 3605 appears to be rarely invoked in cases involving the conduct of 
real estate agents,225 the usual meaning of “selling” and “brokering” would 
readily encompass the work of real estate agents.226 
Significantly, § 3605’s statutory language contains no indication that only 
buyers and tenants, and not sellers and landlords, are capable of being deprived 
of transactions based on race. Textually, the issue boils down to whether the 
“any person” that a covered party may not discriminate against includes only 
the agent’s own actual and potential clients and those counterparties who 
happen to be consumers of housing, or also potential counterparties to the 
transactions in which a realtor’s own clients will engage as purchasers or 
tenants. If no one is to be discriminated against in the availability of 
transactions (as the phrase “any person” would seem to suggest), then it is hard 
 
221 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). 
222 See, e.g., Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1529-30 (7th Cir. 1990). 
223 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). 
224 Id. § 3605(b).  
225 This omission may be due to the broadly applicable set of prohibitions in § 3604, 
which fit better with the usual steering case. But because § 3604 may not apply to 
homeseeker discrimination for the reasons already discussed, § 3605 could do independent 
work in addressing buyer-initiated discrimination carried out by real estate agents. 
226 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.20 (2016) (“Broker or Agent includes any person authorized to 
perform an action on behalf of another person regarding any matter related to the sale or 
rental of dwellings, including offers, solicitations or contracts and the administration of 
matters regarding such offers, solicitations or contracts or any residential real estate-related 
transactions.”). 
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to see why the prohibition would not reach agents who assist clients in carrying 
out racially discriminatory home searches. 
There is some contrary authority on this point, albeit not based on a reading 
of § 3605. A Seventh Circuit decision authored by Judge Posner, Village of 
Bellwood v. Dwivedi,227 indicated that a buyer’s broker who was merely 
satisfying her discriminatory customer’s preferences would not be liable under 
the FHA, as housing customers were presumed to be the beneficiaries, and not 
the targets, of the statute.228 Although recognizing that the biased decisions of 
homebuyers could have a cumulative impact on housing patterns, Judge Posner 
opined that it was not up to brokers “to solve [this] collective-action 
problem.”229 
In 1996, HUD wrestled with the same issue.230 Initially, HUD Assistant 
Secretary Elizabeth Julian responded in the negative when asked whether a 
buyer’s agent would violate the FHA if she complied with a client’s race-based 
search instructions.231 She followed up this response with a second letter 
suggesting such conduct would be unethical and imprudent, even if not 
illegal.232 After significant pushback,233 Julian retracted the initial letter234 and 
 
227 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990). 
228 See id. at 1530 (“The statute prohibits real estate agents from refusing to show 
properties because of the race of the customer, or misleading the customer about the 
availability of properties because of his race, or cajoling or coercing the customer because 
of his race to buy this property or that or look in this community rather than that.”); id. at 
1531 (“[T]he broker who responds to the customer’s desires[] is not discriminating against 
the customer, or denying the customer a dwelling, or misrepresenting to the customer the 
unavailability of a dwelling.”). Like most steering cases, Bellwood focuses on § 3604 and 
does not mention § 3605. See id. at 1525.  
229 Id. at 1530. 
230 It did so in a series of communications from HUD Assistant Secretary Elizabeth 
Julian, which have been collected online by the National Fair Housing Advocate Online. See 
NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ADVOCATE ONLINE, The Buyer’s Agent Issue, TENN. FAIR HOUS. 
COUNCIL, 
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_
buyers_agent [https://perma.cc/8PCE-4D9U] (last visited Dec. 5, 2016).  
231 Letter from Elizabeth K. Julian, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
to Jill D. Levine, Chief Counsel, The Buyer’s Agent, Inc. (Oct. 2, 1996), 
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_
buyers_agent#Initial%20HUD%20Buyer%27s%20Agent%20letter [https://perma.cc/8PCE-
4D9U] [hereinafter October 2, 1996 Julian Letter to Levine] (stating that subject to some 
provisos, “a buyer’s agent would not violate the [FHA] merely by mutely accommodating 
the client's request to limit, on a protected class basis, the search for dwellings”). 
232 Letter from Elizabeth K. Julian, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
to Jill D. Levine, Chief Counsel, The Buyer’s Agent, Inc., 
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_
buyers_agent#Second HUD Buyer’s Agent Letter [https://perma.cc/8PCE-4D9U] (“In short, 
from the standpoint of legally prudent, as well as ethical, considerations, I would strongly 
advise against any agent or broker . . . accommodating a request that a housing search be 
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promised to follow up with “comprehensive guidance” on the point,235 a 
promise that seems to have gone unfulfilled.236 
An assumption underlying these existing analyses is that homeseekers 
themselves could never be held liable for undertaking discriminatory searches 
or making discriminatory housing decisions. But that assumption is both 
inaccurate and irrelevant. It is inaccurate given the analysis above about the 
reach of § 1982.237 It is irrelevant because the law already uncontroversially 
extends greater duties in cases where real estate agents are employed than it 
does when parties to real estate transactions act alone. For example, the single-
family homeowner exception does not apply if the owner uses an agent, and 
the agent himself could be liable in that scenario as well.238 
Moreover, as the earlier discussion of autonomy suggested, homeseekers 
have no plausible normative claim to compel others to help them realize 
discriminatory preferences about their neighbors—at least no claim that would 
be consistent with existing understandings of fair housing law. Well-settled 
understandings of antidiscrimination law already constrain parties to act in 
 
limited based on race, or other protected-class terms. The fact that Section 804(a) of the Fair 
Housing Act may, under limited circumstances, not prohibit such accommodation does not 
make it right, does not make it ethical, and it is not the policy of the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development to endorse such conduct.”).  
233 See Letter from Aurie A. Pennick, President, Leadership Council for Metro. Open 
Cmtys., to Elizabeth K. Julian, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (Nov. 8, 
1996), 
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_
buyers_agent#Aurie%20Pennick%27s%20response%20to%20the%20HUD%20Buyer%20
Agent%20letters [https://perma.cc/8PCE-4D9U] (stating that the October 2, 1996 Julian 
Letter to Levine, supra note 231, “was received with shock and dismay by fair housing 
advocates and many real estate professionals” and asserting that the guidance given in it was 
“unhelpful, illogical, and even dangerous”).  
234 Letter from Elizabeth K. Julian, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
to Aurie Pennick, President, Leadership Council for Metro. Open Cmtys. (Dec. 3, 1996), 
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_
buyers_agent#HUD final Buyer’s Agent letter (response to Aurie Pennick) 
[https://perma.cc/8PCE-4D9U] (“In light of the obvious ‘slippery slope’ down which my 
letter has apparently invited some to slide, and my agreement with you that my letter sent 
the ‘wrong message,’ I have decided to rescind the October 2, 1996 letter, as you requested, 
and develop comprehensive guidance that will address the issue more broadly . . . .”). 
235 Id. 
236 See Hannah v. Sibcy Cline Realtors, 769 N.E.2d 876, 885 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) 
(noting that the promised guidance never materialized). 
237 See supra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.  
238 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603(b)(1), 3604 & 3605 (2012). Similarly, Mrs. Murphy landlords 
are only exempted from § 3604 (with the exception of § 3604(c)). See id. § 3603(b). Thus, if 
Mrs. Murphy hired a realtor, that person could presumably be held liable for discrimination 
under § 3605, even though Mrs. Murphy would not herself be liable under the FHA for 
engaging in the same discrimination.  
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ways that may thwart the strongly held desires of housing consumers for racial 
homogeneity.239 Just as an employer cannot refuse to hire women simply 
because its customers dislike working with women,240 a landlord cannot ban 
people of a particular race or religion simply because most of the landlord’s 
current or prospective tenants do not like living near people of that race or 
religion. Likewise, a real estate agent cannot steer customers away from a 
given neighborhood in order to satisfy the racial preferences of current 
residents or the prospective biases of future homeseekers in that area.241 
These prohibitions thus already operate to effectively withdraw 
discriminatory prerogatives from both residents and prospective 
homeseekers.242 It seems odd to rule out what merely amounts to an additional 
way of withdrawing discriminatory prerogatives from homeseekers: forbidding 
agents from following categorical race-based instructions from 
homeseekers.243 There are also practical difficulties in separating agents’ acts 
directed at catering to the racial preferences they expect homeseekers to have 
(clearly forbidden) from those that merely carry out the expressed racial 
preferences of homeseekers.244 Moreover, the fact that a broker’s other 
potential clients have preferences about racial composition in their current or 
prospective neighborhoods may influence the way that the broker responds to 
the race-based preferences that are stated by her househunting clients. Agents, 
as repeat players who work both sides of the fence, may have a financial 
 
239 See, e.g., supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.  
240 See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 
686 (2001) (“Title VII forbids employers to refuse to hire female candidates to work with 
particular customers even though those customers would be highly reluctant to work with a 
woman.”); Kelman, supra note 125, at 848 (“As a matter of positive law, it is clearly the 
case that an employer cannot refuse to hire as a result of such racist or sexist customer 
preferences.”).  
241 See Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1530 (7th Cir. 1990) (“A person 
who serves as a conduit for another person's discrimination can, it is true, be guilty of 
intentional discrimination, or, what is the same thing, of disparate treatment.”). However, 
the court in Dwivedi distinguished cases in which a realtor steers her homebuying client 
away from a neighborhood based on the preferences of other potential customers in that 
neighborhood or follows the instructions of a selling client not to show the home (both of 
which are clearly impermissible) from a case in which the realtor facilitates the racial 
preferences of her own homebuying client. See id. at 1530-31. 
242 Cf. Kelman, supra note 125, at 848 (suggesting that antidiscrimination law places a 
duty on customers to refrain from discrimination, even though this restriction is enforced 
through constraints placed on the employer). 
243 See id. (describing employers as agents or intermediaries for customers through 
whom antidiscrimination law can be enforced); see also Mark Kelman, Defining the 
Antidiscrimination Norm to Defend It, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 758-59 (2006) (arguing 
that the customers of a business are the “true employers” to whom the antidiscrimination 
norm should be understood to extend).  
244 See Larkin, supra note 9, at 1642, 1648. 
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interest in the content of buyer preferences. At the very least, there is the 
appearance of a conflict of interest when agents are involved in processing and 
carrying out racially biased search instructions. 
Many real estate agents wisely refuse to embroil themselves in furthering 
the discriminatory preferences of their clients. They may instead suggest that 
the clients themselves identify neighborhoods of interest, without the broker 
providing information about the racial composition of the area. Agents might, 
however, increasingly recommend apps or data sources that will enable 
homeseekers to identify neighborhoods that meet their criteria.245 This trend 
raises the stakes for the treatment of those technologies, a topic I turn to now. 
2. Apps and Interactive Online Tools 
Could an app designed to simplify search, or a homeseeker’s use of such an 
app, violate fair housing law? The FHA predated, and thus does not speak 
directly to, the use of apps and other online interfaces. But new ways of 
carrying out prohibited acts can plainly be reached by antidiscrimination law, 
provided there is no countervailing law on the books. For example, it is 
uncontroversial that landlords and sellers who post discriminatory ads on the 
internet can be liable under the FHA, even though the Communications 
Decency Act limits the liability of internet service providers who do nothing 
more than serve as conduits for these discriminatory ads.246 
Providers of interactive tools that elicit information about protected 
characteristics from homeseekers or facilitate the filtering of applicants for 
housing based on those characteristics can also incur liability under § 3604(c). 
In an earlier stage of the Roommate.com litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that 
an online interface that prompts users to provide personal information and 
specify preferences corresponding to protected statuses could run afoul of the 
FHA’s advertising provision, notwithstanding the immunity offered to internet 
service providers by the Communications Decency Act.247 Of course, that 
interface elicited information and preferences from those who were offering 
housing as well as those who were seeking housing.248 But if § 3604(c) were 
 
245 See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 55 (reporting on a broker’s belief that providing 
demographic data directly to clients would violate fair housing laws, leading her to instead 
recommend apps that will provide the same data).  
246 See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Using the remarkably candid postings on craigslist, the 
Lawyers’ Committee can identify many targets to investigate. It can dispatch testers and 
collect damages from any landlord or owner who engages in discrimination.”).  
247 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1164-72 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit later ruled that roommates are 
not making decisions about “dwellings” and hence fall outside the FHA entirely. See Fair 
Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1222 (9th 
Cir. 2012). But the earlier holding remains relevant for situations that do not involve shared 
housing.  
248 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1161 (observing that the Roommates.com website 
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found to apply to homeseeking, as suggested above, the seeker/provider 
distinction would disappear. Both the person using the interface to restrict 
search based on racial criteria and the website provider enabling this 
functionality could be potentially liable. 
Consider an online tool or mobile app that aggregated information about the 
races of sellers or landlords and permitted users to filter listings on this basis. 
Section 3604(c) liability could be triggered by the statements or preferences 
communicated by the user to the application.249 Even if such an interface were 
deemed too attenuated from any particular sale or rental to generate liability 
under § 3604(c), a homeseeker’s use of such a tool could provide proof of a 
§ 1982 violation in withdrawing opportunities for sales and rental transactions 
from individuals based on race.250 Such an app could be readily distinguished 
from tools that enable homeseekers (and others) to learn about neighborhood 
conditions, including racial composition.251 Because data on neighborhood 
racial composition could be used in any number of valid, nondiscriminatory 
ways—from assessing changes in neighborhoods over time to reassuring 
homeseekers that they were making integrative rather than segregative 
moves—there are compelling normative reasons to resist restricting access to 
such information.252 
A particularly interesting set of questions is raised by the prospect of 
interactive tools that would allow households to coordinate their home 
selection decisions with each other, without involving a developer, landlord, or 
realtor. For example, groups of in-movers could coordinate in virtual space, 
privately, to enter a new or redeveloping community. If such tools are not 
already available, it seems inevitable they soon will be. Indeed, a recent novel 
set in Detroit had what one character termed a “Groupon model of 
 
was “designed to match people renting out spare rooms with people looking for a place to 
live”).  
249 Cf. Jancik v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 44 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that a landlord’s question about race can, in context, violate § 3604(c)). 
250 Cf. Schwemm, supra note 155, at 251-55 (discussing evidentiary use of 
discriminatory ads and statements).  
251 A more difficult intermediate case, which I will return to below, would be an app that 
not only informs about racial composition but also enables categorical screening of listings 
on that basis. See infra notes 274-76 and accompanying text. 
252 Indeed, HUD itself is making rich and detailed racial data and an associated mapping 
tool publicly available as part of its new approach to affirmatively furthering fair housing. 
See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
Affirmatively Further Fair Housing: Assessment Tool, 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/affht_pt.html#affhassess-tab [https://perma.cc/Q44W-
D2JA] (last visited Dec. 5, 2016). While it is possible this information might be used for 
discriminatory purposes as well as worthy ones, its capacity to identify and address 
segregation makes it valuable on balance. I thank Nestor Davidson for comments on this 
point. 
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gentrification” as a primary plot element.253 What should the role of the law be 
with respect to such coordination? 
On one hand, housing coordination of this sort is merely a scaled up and 
high tech version of the kinds of decisions that homeseekers already make—
and which are widely viewed as immune from legal action.254 On the other, 
coordinated action might seem like a larger threat to housing access.255 Even if 
disconnected individual decisions lie beyond the law, efforts to coordinate 
those decisions might not. Such coordinated action could make dwellings 
unavailable under § 3604(a). Moreover, some interactive tools designed to 
coordinate behavior could violate § 3604(e), the FHA’s anti-blockbusting 
provision, which makes it unlawful “[f]or profit, to induce or attempt to induce 
any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry 
or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a 
particular race [or other protected status].”256 An app that merely predicted 
future racial trends would not be attempting to induce anyone to sell or rent, 
but a for-profit coordination platform that prominently included racial data 
might seem to do exactly that. 
Reaching coordination tools, however, would be a double-edged sword. As 
this Article’s analysis has suggested, the existing uncoordinated patterns of 
homeseeking decisions already pose a serious threat to fair housing, if a largely 
unrecognized one.257 If it is more difficult to achieve integrated outcomes 
through unguided and fragmented individual choices than it is to perpetuate 
segregated outcomes through those same dispersed choices, cracking down on 
mechanisms for coordinating and guiding choice could run counter to the 
project of advancing integration. This point bears on doctrine to the extent that 
the integrative purpose of the FHA informs interpretation of its provisions. 
Regardless of the state of current law, apps bring another actor onto the 
scene (the app designer) who could be the subject of legal and policy 
directives. Certain kinds of functionality that would tend to produce a 
segregative effect might be analyzed under disparate impact analysis, as I will 
discuss below, although a robust nondiscriminatory interest in the free 
availability and use of data would strictly limit this avenue. Nonetheless, there 
may be other ways in which these new data tools could be addressed to 
 
253 BENJAMIN MARKOVITS, YOU DON’T HAVE TO LIVE LIKE THIS 17 (2015). In the novel, 
a developer served as a coordinator and appeared to have the power to select which groups 
would actually receive blocks of houses, but it is easy to imagine models in which groups 
and individuals could go to a website to coordinate blocks of proposed purchases on their 
own.  
254 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
255 Coordination of race-based preference fulfillment through zoning or covenants, for 
example, is actionable. See supra notes 131-35; see also Seicshnaydre, supra note 3, at 972-
73 (discussing connections between the preferences of white homeseekers and zoning 
policy).  
256 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2012).  
257 See supra Section I.A. 
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advance fair housing. Most notably, the affirmatively further mandate might 
include incentives for innovative apps that would help to debias search and 
advance integration.258 
IV. SHIFTING COSTS 
Although the approach detailed in Part III would break new doctrinal ground 
and carry considerable expressive force, it would likely make only limited 
inroads into closing the search gap.259 Consistent with the normative 
constraints outlined in Part II, it would preserve a realm of decisional 
autonomy in which bias could operate unchecked. The associated costs must 
be borne by someone—whether those who find their housing opportunities 
diminished due to their protected status, or other parties who are in a position 
to bear or mitigate those costs. This Part explores some of the ways that these 
costs might be shifted among parties. 
A. Theories and Limits 
The FHA contains two powerful doctrinal levers for shifting the costs of 
biased homeseeking: the disparate impact cause of action, and the mandate to 
affirmatively further fair housing. Each of these potential avenues for closing 
the search gap will be explored in more detail below. Notably, however, even 
legal prohibitions on disparate treatment shift some costs associated with 
biased search. For example, landlords, developers, and real estate agents are 
not permitted to discriminate based on protected status even when placed under 
great financial pressure to do so by prospective tenants, buyers, or clients.260 
Legal compliance in these situations can mean forfeiting income.261 
Prohibitions on such customer-catering discrimination can be understood not 
only as a means of effectively overriding certain consumer preferences, then, 
but also as a technology for shifting costs associated with certain forms of 
homeseeker discrimination onto housing providers and brokers. 
Disparate impact and the affirmatively further mandate offer more overt 
means of reallocating bias-related costs. Biased search heuristics factor into 
these theories in two ways, supplying both a “why” and a “how.” First, the 
existence of discriminatory homeseeking and its effects in perpetuating 
 
258 See infra Section IV.C.2.  
259 The effect is difficult to predict because a change in search norms could yield more 
significant results than might be expected based on enforcement prospects alone. See 
Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 8, at 256-57 (suggesting that even a difficult-to-enforce legal 
change could carry expressive force and influence norms). See generally MCADAMS, supra 
note 84 (examining the power of the law to communicate norms and enable people to 
coordinate their behavior, even in the absence of enforcement). Whatever the size of the 
response, any decrease in discriminatory conduct on the part of homeseekers will reduce the 
costs that other parties must bear as a result of such conduct.  
260 See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.  
261 Cf. Jolls, supra note 240, at 686-87 (making this point in the employment context).  
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segregation provide a rationale for compensatory efforts, as well as a basis for 
rebutting the notion that optimal integration levels have already been achieved. 
Second, a focus on search tactics provides substantive guidance about the 
shape that such corrective efforts might take. 
Efforts to promote integration can come under fire for being too aggressive 
as well as for being too anemic.262 Race-conscious efforts to influence 
cumulative homeseeker decisions, as through integration maintenance 
programs directed at addressing tipping dynamics, confront legal barriers.263 
And in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc.,264 the Supreme Court expressed wariness about 
(although it did not completely rule out) the possibility of race-conscious 
remedies for disparate impact violations.265 Nonetheless, the affirmatively 
further mandate, along with the Court’s recognition of the FHA’s goal of 
integration in connection with its disparate impact analysis, offer potential 
hooks for supporting (or at least not outlawing) a variety of cost-shifting 
approaches. 
B. Disparate Impact 
The disparate impact cause of action, recently recognized by the Court in 
Inclusive Communities, offers one avenue for shifting the costs of biased 
search onto parties who are in a good position to bear or mitigate them.266 
Although disparate impact is at least partly justified by its ability to “smoke 
out” intentional discrimination that is simply too difficult to prove,267 in 
prototypical form it reaches conduct that is both facially neutral and neutral in 
intent. Neutral policies can have a discriminatory effect if they reach factors 
that correlate with protected group status. Often those correlations were 
 
262 Cf. Saul Levmore, The Mortgage Crisis and Affirmative Action, UNIV. OF CHI. L. 
SCH.: FAC. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2007, 6:03 PM), 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/09/mortgage-crisis.html 
[https://perma.cc/CS2U-AWV4] (discussing settings involving “regulation from two 
directions”). 
263 See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(striking down an integration maintenance plan as violating the FHA).  
264 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
265 See id. at 2524-25.  
266 Because the disparate impact cause of action has been recognized for decades by 
courts of appeals, see id. at 2525, there has already been considerable experience with some 
of these approaches. 
267 See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 125, at 891 n.86 (“Certainly, one use of disparate 
impact law is to smoke out ‘canonical’ disparate treatment, to forbid seemingly neutral 
practices that were actually put into place in order to exclude people because of status.”); 
see also Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522 (“Recognition of disparate-impact liability 
under the FHA also plays a role in uncovering discriminatory intent: It permits plaintiffs to 
counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as 
disparate treatment.”).  
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produced by intentional discrimination by actors whose conduct is, for 
whatever reason, not readily reachable by law.268 
Consider Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,269 the case that held disparate impact 
claims to be cognizable under Title VII.270 There, the screening administered 
by the employer (tests and a high school graduation requirement) yielded 
disparate results that tracked racial lines due to past racial discrimination, 
including segregated schools.271 Of course, many of the African American job 
applicants who failed the screen did so for reasons unrelated to their race just 
as many white applicants failed the screen, but it is a statistical certainty that 
some of the black applicants were disadvantaged because of race.272 The 
disparate impact cause of action does not ask for these past causal chains to be 
untangled, but rather requires that a less discriminatory alternative be put in 
place if one is available. 
In the housing context, certain choices of public and private actors interact 
with homeseeker biases to produce results that entrench segregation. 
Challenging those choices through disparate impact analysis offers a way of 
ameliorating the impacts of homeseeker biases. For example, changes in 
zoning classifications that catalyze rapid and concentrated gentrification while 
constraining the production of housing in other neighborhoods can be 
challenged based on their predicted interaction with homeseeker choices. 
Disparate impact analysis has already been used to challenge, with some 
success, decisions about the location of affordable housing or the permissibility 
of different categories of housing stock in a given municipality.273 
There are other, less familiar ways in which disparate impact claims might 
be used to address or backfill the search gap. For example, disparate impact 
analysis might be used to evaluate search practices facilitated by particular data 
manipulation tools. Suppose an app were created that allowed users to filter 
real estate listings based on maximum percentages of households of a 
particular race residing within a certain radius of the property. Further, suppose 
it were shown that widespread use of this type of tool within a particular 
geographic area tended to perpetuate patterns of segregative housing choices—
 
268 This is not to suggest that identifying such prior discrimination is a prerequisite to 
liability—plainly it is not. In the contexts of sex and disability, for example, liability can be 
imposed based on differences that were not due to anyone’s discrimination. See Zatz, supra 
note 122 (manuscript at 34-35). 
269 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
270 See id. at 431. 
271 See id. at 427-28, 430-31.  
272 See Zatz, supra note 122 (manuscript at 27-32). 
273 See generally Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An 
Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 
63 AM. U. L. REV. 357 (2013) (analyzing and collecting data on the use of disparate impact 
analysis in different categories of cases, including ones involving “housing barriers” such as 
exclusionary zoning). 
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a type of discriminatory effect recognized by both HUD and the Supreme 
Court as supporting a disparate impact claim.274 
Of course, showing a discriminatory effect is just the first step in making out 
such a claim. Under the burden-shifting approach adapted from Griggs, the 
defendant has an opportunity to present a valid nondiscriminatory reason for 
the policy or practice, which the plaintiff then must show can be achieved 
through a less discriminatory alternative.275 The fact that data tools might be 
used to support integrative as well as segregative housing searches provides a 
nondiscriminatory reason for offering and employing such a tool. But a less 
discriminatory alternative than enabling users to place “ceilings” on particular 
groups might be an app that allowed users to specify minimum percentages of 
a particular race, perhaps capped at fifty percent. Such an approach would 
allow some in-group clustering as well as integrationist efforts, without 
supporting searches for segregated areas.276 It would not keep people from 
using data to find more segregated neighborhoods if they wished to do so, but 
it would keep doing so from being a routinized and potentially focal practice. 
An app like the fictitious Tiebout2Go, which would seek to replicate as 
closely as possible an individual’s current residential situation in a new 
 
274 HUD’s regulation is explicit on this point. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2016) (“A practice 
has a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a 
group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns 
because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”). 
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed this regulatory definition, its 
statements and analysis in Inclusive Communities indicate that it views a segregative effect 
as supporting disparate impact liability. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (observing that “disparate-
impact liability may prevent segregated housing patterns that might otherwise result from 
covert and illicit stereotyping”); id. (“[T]he FHA aims to ensure that [housing authorities’] 
priorities can be achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating 
segregation.”); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Disparate Impact and the Limits of Local Discretion 
After Inclusive Communities, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 
23-24), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2823813 [https://perma.cc/LMB8-L6ZT] (observing that 
the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities “acknowledged the continuing vitality of the 
perpetuation of segregation theory under the FHA” through its statements and its 
endorsement of past cases employing that theory). 
275 See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522-23; 24 C.F.R. § 100.500. The precise 
formulation of the disparate impact test under the FHA remains open to question. See, e.g., 
Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive Communities: What’s New 
and What’s Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 121 (2015) (noting minor wording 
differences between HUD’s disparate impact rule and the Court’s statements about disparate 
impact in Inclusive Communities). 
276 It is noteworthy that such an approach would appear to interfere relatively little with 
the broad run of African American neighborhood composition preferences while having 
more bite in addressing white racial composition preferences. See supra notes 110-12 and 
accompanying text (discussing empirical evidence of asymmetric preferences for 
neighborhood composition). 
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metropolitan area,277 could also be subject to disparate impact analysis if it 
tended to have a segregative effect. Here, the nondiscriminatory rationale 
would be that of facilitating relocation into areas that match one’s current 
location—a way of “not moving” (or not moving as much) when one moves. 
After all, continuing to live in a segregated neighborhood also entrenches 
segregation, but there are compelling nondiscriminatory reasons that people 
might wish to stay where they are. These interests are attenuated when one 
seeks to replicate one’s current environment elsewhere, however. A less 
discriminatory approach might permit matching only on factors other than 
racial composition, or adding some degree of randomization as to race and 
closely correlated factors.278 
In sum, the persistence of homeseeker discrimination shows that disparate 
impact analysis remains relevant for countering the effects of ongoing, 
intentional racial discrimination in the housing domain. The search gap is by 
no means the only justification for recognizing a disparate impact cause of 
action, nor the only source of misalignment between fair housing rights and 
currently recognized intent-based duties. Many forms of past and ongoing 
discrimination that cannot be reached by the law can interact with neutral 
policies to constrain housing options “because of race.”279 Nonetheless, the 
search gap is an especially interesting place to focus attention when 
considering disparate impact as a cost-shifting mechanism. It shows that some 
of the work that disparate impact analysis might do is not about fixing obscure 
problems far back in the causal chain, but rather about addressing here-and-
now intentional racial discrimination that we cannot or will not tackle head-
on.280 
 
277 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
278 See infra notes 305-09 and accompanying text. 
279 For discussion of the meaning of “because of race” as it relates to disparate impact, 
see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Because and Effect: Another Take on Inclusive 
Communities, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 85 (2016); Noah D. Zatz, The Many Meanings of 
“Because of”: A Comment on Inclusive Communities Project, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 68 
(2015). 
280 Cf. Alan Wertheimer, Reflections on Discrimination, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 945, 958 
(2006) (“Precisely because society decides to allow racially based mating choices, it may 
also acquire a responsibility to remedy or soften the harmful social consequences of such 
choices.”). Put differently, the legitimacy of granting broad decisional authority to 
individual households in the home selection domain may be contingent on other societal 
efforts that ensure its cumulative exercise will not unduly damage the interests of other 
households. Thus, a normative commitment to decisional privacy might justify shifting the 
burden of delivering fair housing opportunities, but would not justify ignoring the obligation 
altogether. See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
1395, 1428 (2016) (observing that one way to address conflicts between the demands of 
relational justice and other commitments of the state is “to restrict individual responsibility 
by shifting some of the burden onto public law, thereby preventing or limiting the conflict 
with distributive or democratic commitments”). 
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C. Affirmatively Furthering 
The FHA obligates HUD to “administer the programs and activities relating 
to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the 
policies of [the FHA].”281 In a July 2015 final rule, HUD defined 
“affirmatively furthering fair housing” as “taking meaningful actions, in 
addition to combating discrimination, that overcome patterns of segregation 
and foster inclusive communities free from barriers that restrict access to 
opportunity based on protected characteristics.”282 Under this rule, grant 
recipients such as local governments and public housing authorities must 
submit an Assessment of Fair Housing that documents current housing 
patterns, sets goals to improve them, and details impediments and plans for 
overcoming them.283 
HUD does not mandate any particular outcomes or set any benchmarks, 
however, much less specify sanctions for failing to reach them.284 Nonetheless, 
HUD’s new emphasis on the affirmatively further mandate supports efforts to 
overcome patterns associated with presumptively unreachable forms of 
conduct. Below, I consider some strategies that change the mix of information 
available to searchers, innovate in other ways within the search space, or 
change what is at stake when homeseekers make housing decisions. 
1. Information Strategies 
Information-based strategies can alter the search environment by either 
adding or subtracting information.285 The former category includes efforts to 
 
281 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012). Another provision mandates cooperation by other 
executive departments and agencies in affirmatively furthering the purposes of the FHA. Id. 
§ 3608(d). 
282 Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,353 (July 16, 2015) 
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 5.152). In the past, HUD required local governments, housing 
authorities, and other grant recipients to create an “Analysis of Impediments” to Fair 
Housing. Id. at 42,272. This document “was generally not submitted to or reviewed by 
HUD” however, and was found to be “not as effective as originally envisioned.” Id.; see 
also Rigel C. Oliveri, Beyond Disparate Impact: How the Fair Housing Movement Can 
Move On, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 625, 642-43 (2015) (discussing HUD’s history of neglecting 
the affirmatively further mandate and citing the 2006 Westchester County litigation as a 
turning point). 
283 Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,355 (to be codified at 
24 C.F.R. § 5.154). 
284 See id. at 42,272 (“While the statutory duty to affirmatively further fair housing 
requires program participants to take actions to affirmatively further fair housing, this final 
rule . . . does not mandate specific outcomes for the planning process.”). Rather, the rule 
requires those whom it funds to chart their own progress, set benchmarks, and identify 
obstacles and ways of overcoming them. See id. at 42,286-87 (describing comments on this 
issue and providing a response). 
285 In other words, as Lior Strahilevitz puts it, law can employ “search lights” or 
“curtains.” Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous 
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address homebuyer search heuristics through affirmative marketing. In Steptoe 
v. Beverly Area Planning Ass’n,286 for example, a nonprofit community 
organization, the Beverly Area Planning Association (“BAPA”), provided 
information to homeseekers who were interested in making “nontraditional 
moves.”287 Beverly, a historically predominantly white neighborhood on the 
far southwest side of Chicago, had become integrated, and BAPA was 
concerned about maintaining that integration against resegregation.288 To that 
end, it provided bifurcated housing advice, informing white homeseekers about 
housing opportunities within the integrated Beverly neighborhood, but 
directing black homeseekers to predominantly white areas in nearby 
suburbs.289 
The court upheld BAPA’s selective provision of information against FHA 
and § 1982 challenges.290 It found that BAPA did not control access to 
housing, held no monopoly on housing information, and disclosed to 
homeseekers the selective nature of the information that it would provide.291 
BAPA was thus deemed to be merely providing extra information about 
integrative moves to those who sought it out.292 
Affirmative marketing efforts were likewise upheld in another Chicago-area 
case, South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of 
Realtors.293 There, the South-Suburban Housing Center (“SSHC”) made extra 
efforts to interest white homebuyers in homes it had bought in an area of Park 
Forest that had become known as a “black block.”294 The Seventh Circuit held 
that this did not violate the FHA, because black homebuyers were not 
dissuaded or misinformed about the opportunities.295 Although the court noted 
that any steering based on a customer’s race would be impermissible, it held 
that “[i]n the absence of concrete evidence of this nature . . . we see nothing 
wrong with SSHC attempting to attract white persons to housing opportunities 
they might not ordinarily know about and thus choose to pursue.”296 
 
Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1711-13 (2008) (explaining how law can 
use search lights and curtains, in addition to carrots and sticks, and highlighting the way that 
the former two strategies might be used in the antidiscrimination context); see also 
STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 143, at 157-72. 
286 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ill. 1987).  
287 Id. at 1315. 
288 Id. at 1315-16.  
289 Id. at 1316. 
290 Id. at 1318-23. 
291 Id. at 1319-20. 
292 Id. 
293 935 F.2d 868, 881-85 (7th Cir. 1991). 
294 Id. at 873. The purchases of the homes by SSHC followed a wave of foreclosures and 
blight in the neighborhood. Id. 
295 Id. at 884. 
296 Id. 
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As in Steptoe, the information provided by SSHC was deemed to be purely 
additive, and offered in support of one of the FHA’s goals: integration.297 
Neither group’s provision of extra information would be necessary or useful if 
home search decisions were already being made in a race-neutral way. In both 
cases, the need to counter existing race-based decision patterns provided the 
impetus and the justification. Nonetheless, selectively channeling information 
about neighborhood opportunities to white homeseekers is a less normatively 
attractive way to address biased search than finding race-neutral mechanisms 
to disrupt established search heuristics. Below, I will consider some ways that 
emerging technologies might support such alternatives. 
The opposite strategy—removing information—has also been attempted by 
communities, primarily in the context of attempting to arrest white flight. As 
Schelling’s analysis suggests, housing decisions can produce cascades;298 thus, 
shielding some moves from view could keep other moves from occurring at all. 
Starting in the 1970s, a number of communities experimented with limits on 
“for sale” signs, in an effort to arrest a destructive dynamic in which 
knowledge of sales sets off more sales.299 There are constitutional limits on this 
approach, however, and in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of 
Willingboro,300 the Supreme Court struck down such a sign ban on First 
Amendment grounds.301 Yet sign bans still exist in some communities, even if 
only enforced through social norms.302 
Today’s information-rich environment provides many more ways to access 
information about homes for sale, but there may still be something viscerally 
significant and especially salient about physical signs. For one thing, 
homeowners who have no thought of moving are unlikely to be actively 
 
297 See id. 
298 See, e.g., Schelling, supra note 104, at 173-75 (discussing the role of speculative 
expectations about neighborhood change in exit decisions).  
299 See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 162-63; Steven Jackson, Not in Your Front Yard: 
Why “For Sale” Signs Are Banned in Oak Park, WBEZ: CURIOUS CITY (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.wbez.org/shows/curious-city/not-in-your-front-yard-why-for-sale-signs-are-
banned-in-oak-park/5d93f1e7-8540-495c-bbca-6bc7a4430702 [https://perma.cc/FJY8-
8X6D].  
300 431 U.S. 85 (1977).  
301 Id. at 98. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Marshall observed that an alternative to 
prohibiting “for sale” signs would be for white homeowners to send a competing message 
with “not for sale” signs. Id. at 97. For a discussion of the use and effects of “not for sale” 
signs, including their potential to unwittingly telegraph that racial transition is underway, 
see RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD 193-202 
(2013). 
302 See, e.g., OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE § 13-2-3 (2016) (banning “for sale” and “for 
rent” signs, with exceptions for new construction or conversions); id. § 13-2-3.1 (allowing 
open house signs on Sundays only, for periods of four hours or less); Jackson, supra note 
299 (discussing Oak Park’s informal enforcement mechanisms, including “a long-standing 
agreement” with local real estate agents). 
  
414 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:349 
 
monitoring online real estate listings, but they can hardly avoid noticing a fresh 
crop of “for sale” signs as they drive through the neighborhood. For the very 
same reason, banning signs impinges on the ordinary workings of the market. 
As a seller, one might wish to capture the attention not only of potential buyers 
who are actively searching for listings, but also those who might be willing to 
consider a move to the right property. Nonetheless, the sign ban arguably 
solved a collective action problem for residents that may have left even the 
sellers better off on balance than if it did not exist. 
Even if this sort of information suppression could keep existing integrated 
neighborhoods from resegregating, it would do little to address existing 
segregation. Other forms of information suppression, such as hiding 
demographic data, might be expected to do more harm than good. At the same 
time, there might be room to encourage data aggregation and use tools that 
shield some forms of information from view while highlighting others.303 
Another alternative is to raise the (implicit or explicit) price of obtaining 
certain kinds of information, or to subsidize choices made in the absence of 
that information. Some possibilities along these lines are discussed next. 
2. Innovating in the Search Space 
Although past information strategies offer some doctrinal guideposts, the 
affirmatively further mandate offers an opportunity for communities to pursue 
innovative new strategies in the search space—ones that might be capable of 
shaking up existing patterns and reducing reliance on racial proxies. At a meta-
level, communities might find ways to incentivize integrative innovations in 
search technologies. Social impact bonds offer one tool for harnessing results-
oriented policy ideas.304 These bonds make payoffs contingent on a grantee’s 
ability to deliver measurable results along a particular, verifiable metric—
which here might mean reducing certain measures of segregation and 
achieving particular affirmative indicia of successful and stable integration. 
Because housing patterns depend on complex interdependent patterns of 
behavior, there is a primary role for fostering new search norms and for 
developing new focal strategies to guide search. Apps and interactive tools 
might do this in a variety of ways at a variety of scales. Consider, for example, 
the possibility that a community could develop and popularize a free pro-
integration housing search tool. Such an interface could build on a variety of 
the strategies discussed above, whether by suppressing certain kinds of 
 
303 See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 285, at 1711-13. 
304 See, e.g., ANDREW PALMER, SMART MONEY 89-112 (2015); J.B. Wogan, Can Social 
Impact Bonds Help Reduce Homelessness?, GOVERNING: FINANCE (Sept. 8, 2015), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-social-impact-bonds-help-santa-clara-county-
reduce-homelessness.html [https://perma.cc/49E8-3MGM]; Ronnie Horesh, Injecting 
Incentives into the Solution of Social Problems: Social Policy Bonds, 20 ECON. AFF. 39, 39 
(2000); Hanna Azemati et al., Social Impact Bonds: Lessons Learned So Far, COMMUNITY 
DEV. INV. REV. (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F.), Apr. 2013, at 32. 
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information, highlighting others, or simply introducing a certain amount of 
random perturbation into the results that it delivers. 
Social scientists have used the notion of “simulated annealing” to capture 
the sorts of random mutations that may enable moves to higher valued 
equilibria.305 In the present context, introducing noise into search could prompt 
changes that would ultimately catalyze larger shifts from self-reinforcing 
housing patterns.306 Recent work on algorithms has similarly suggested that 
introducing randomness might help to break down past patterns infected by 
discrimination and avoid replicating disparities.307 For example, Joshua Kroll 
and his coauthors have suggested that a hiring algorithm might be set up to hire 
some candidates who fail to meet existing predictive criteria—and then track 
their performance to allow the algorithm to learn.308 In the housing context, a 
user might be prompted to input neighborhoods that she knows she would like 
to search within, and the app might automatically blend the results with those 
from similar neighborhoods with which she might be less familiar.309 
Certain search tools might even enable a kind of “blind booking” model 
with respect to setting up appointments to see residential units.310 Such an 
approach could allow the user to set detailed parameters about commuting 
times from employment and school locations, the specifics of the housing unit 
itself, and the nonprotected characteristics of neighbors. Apps and search tools 
 
305 See Ken Kollman, John H. Miller & Scott E. Page, Political Institutions and Sorting 
in a Tiebout Model, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 977, 989 (1997) (“A minor mistake . . . can 
dislodge the system from a relatively bad local optimum, and induce agents to re-sort 
themselves into a better configuration.”). 
306 See Richard R. W. Brooks, The Banality of Racial Inequality, 124 YALE L.J. 2626, 
2655-61 (2015) (reviewing ROITHMAYR, supra note 5) (discussing Daria Roithmayr’s use of 
the Polya urn model to illustrate path dependence and explaining how introducing random 
variation into the urn-filling operation could break the pattern). 
307 See Chander, supra note 64 (manuscript at 15-19 (discussing the use of “algorithmic 
affirmative action” to address discriminatory results); Kroll et al., supra note 64, at 683-84. 
308 Kroll et al., supra note 64, at 684 (“By occasionally guessing about candidates for 
whom the model cannot make confident predictions, the model can gather additional data 
and evolve to become more faithful to the real world.”). 
309 Cf. Eillie Anzilotti, This Mapping App Is Designed for Urban Wanderers, ATLANTIC 
CITYLAB: NAVIGATOR (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/navigator/2016/02/this-app-
will-turn-you-into-an-urban-wanderer/470577/ [https://perma.cc/G7QZ-AJLU] (describing 
the Likeways wayfinding app that claims to consciously build in serendipity and take users 
on less traveled paths). 
310 Under these models, consumers commit to a particular expenditure, such as for a 
flight or a hotel, before learning exactly where they will be going or what they will be 
getting. See, e.g., Scott McCartney, The Best Airline Bargains, If You Have a Taste for 
Adventure, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 2, 2015, 1:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-best-
airline-bargains-if-you-have-a-taste-for-adventure-1441214282 [https://perma.cc/8XMJ-
485W]; Susan Stellin, Taking Some Mystery Out of Blind Booking, N.Y. TIMES: GETAWAY 
(Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/travel/taking-some-mystery-out-of-
blind-booking.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/437T-KL7B];. 
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might also make use of certain kinds of information and not others, or require a 
separate “unmasking” step to consciously gain certain pieces of data about 
racial composition or the racial identity of counterparties (such as might be 
derived from pictures).311 It could become an act of social consciousness to 
choose search tools and settings that mask information that could, even 
unconsciously, lead to biased actions.312 
While this family of approaches would not be of interest to every 
homeseeker, tools for debiasing search could soften preconceived ideas about 
how one goes about finding a residence and change norms surrounding the 
search process.313 By incentivizing the use of search technologies that 
consciously embed surprising results, law and policy could take a more active 
role in disrupting segregated housing patterns. 
 
311 See, e.g., Chander, supra note 64, at 17-18 (discussing how Uber’s platform design 
structures the disclosure of passenger information). Similarly, Airbnb has recently 
announced changes aimed at countering discrimination on its platform, including reducing 
the emphasis placed on profile photos—although it is unclear how this de-emphasis will be 
implemented or whether it will meaningfully reduce bias. See Katie Benner, Airbnb Adopts 
Rules to Fight Discrimination by Its Hosts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/technology/airbnb-anti-discrimination-
rules.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PX2A-GRDZ]. The potential for racially identifiable 
information to generate biased results has been documented in a number of studies. See 
Edelman & Luca, supra note 193 (finding racial discrimination against Airbnb landlords 
based on profile photos); Jennifer L. Doleac & Luke C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand: Race 
and Online Market Outcomes, 123 ECON. J. F469 (2013) (finding racial discrimination in 
online sale of iPods based on hands visible in the image); Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca 
& Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy, 9 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED 
ECON. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2701902 
[https://perma.cc/D6UV-46LK] (finding that Airbnb guests with distinctively African 
American names had their requests rejected more often than guests with distinctively white 
names). 
312 See EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 59-60 (2015) (discussing 
attentional norms including “norms of disattention” that involve conscious aversion of one’s 
gaze in certain settings and “attentional taboos” that call for avoidance of certain types of 
information in decisionmaking). In addition to masking information about others from one’s 
own view in order to reduce the risk of unconscious bias, norms might develop around 
suppressing information about oneself that could produce bias—even in one’s own favor. 
For example, one Airbnb user reported replacing her profile photo with a photo of a 
landscape in order to reduce bias against her. See Shankar Vedantam, #AirbnbWhileBlack: 
How Hidden Bias Shapes the Sharing Economy, NPR: HIDDEN BRAIN (Apr. 26, 2016, 12:10 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/26/475623339/-airbnbwhileblack-how-hidden-bias-
shapes-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/9VB3-QMKA]. If large numbers of socially 
conscious Airbnb users did likewise, whether or not they anticipated being discriminated 
against, the lack of a personal photo would not convey any information about protected 
characteristics but would instead simply make a statement against discrimination.  
313 See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
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3. Changing Stakes 
If property value concerns are a significant driver of race-based 
homeseeking, then one approach might be to lower the stakes associated with 
property value changes. Ingrid Gould Ellen observes that pro-homeownership 
policies may entrench segregation, since data shows that homeowners are more 
sensitive than renters to racial composition.314 Thus, a very basic move to 
support integration would be to alter the law’s relative treatment of different 
tenure forms. Significantly, § 3608(d) of the FHA requires all federal agencies 
to cooperate with HUD in affirmatively furthering fair housing.315 One way to 
do so would be to cut back on tax subsidies for homeownership.316 
Another stake-lowering approach might be to encourage rent-to-own 
alternatives. Not only does the available evidence indicate that homebuyers are 
more sensitive to neighborhood racial composition than renters, it also suggests 
that the decision to move in is more sensitive to neighborhood racial 
composition than the decision to move out.317 These two facts considered in 
tandem suggest that considerable leverage might be provided by a “try it 
before you buy it” approach to location decisions.318 Accordingly, encouraging 
 
314 See ELLEN, supra note 6, at 176; Freeman & Cai, supra note 7, at 313 (finding a 
“negative relationship between the homeownership rate and white invasion [of black 
neighborhoods]” and suggesting that this “is consistent with Ellen’s (2000) argument that 
white renters will be more comfortable taking the risk of moving into black neighborhoods 
because they have less at stake than owners”). 
315 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2012). 
316 There have been many calls to end the mortgage interest tax deduction, although such 
proposals are usually spurred by concerns about housing consumption distortions or 
distributive effects. For a recent review of the literature and discussion of some potentially 
offsetting effects on location choices, see generally David Albuoy & Andrew Hanson, Are 
Houses Too Big or In the Wrong Place? Tax Benefits to Housing and Inefficiencies in 
Location and Consumption, in 28 TAX POL’Y & THE ECON. 63 (Jeffrey R. Brown ed., 2014). 
There have also been some proposals to restrict the mortgage interest deduction to 
incentivize certain housing goals, including integration. See, e.g., JAMES W. LOEWEN, 
SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM 443-45 (2005) (proposing 
that residents of segregated white towns be made ineligible for the mortgage interest 
deduction); NATALIE Y. MOORE, THE SOUTH SIDE 32 (2016) (recounting Dorothy Brown’s 
suggestion that the mortgage interest deduction be eliminated in neighborhoods that are not 
at least ten percent African American); Boger, supra note 3, at 1606-10 (proposing phase-
outs of the mortgage interest deduction and property tax deduction for residents of 
communities that have failed to meet certain “fair share” housing targets). By applying 
penalties at the community level, however, these proposals run the risk of imposing costs 
not just on excluders but also on those who have overcome their exclusionary tactics, or 
who would wish to do so in the future. See Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1273 n.154 (2006). 
317 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
318 For very short-term versions of the “try before you buy” model, see infra note 332 
and accompanying text. 
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rent-to-own alternatives, through tax policy or otherwise, might be one way to 
affirmatively further fair housing.319 
Home equity insurance offers another possibility, one that has been written 
about extensively and attempted in at least a few communities.320 Here, the 
idea is to allow homeowners to offload some of the risk of property value 
decline to investors or insurers in the hope of reducing sensitivity to changes in 
the local area. Although typically raised in the context of stemming white 
flight or addressing NIMBYism, it could also support more integrative move-
in decisions. White in-movers may avoid areas with relatively small minority 
populations if they fear that a dynamic process is underway that will transform 
the neighborhood into a largely minority one. Insuring against declines in 
home value that are not attributable to the homeowner’s own decisions on her 
parcel could ease this fear. 
Among the critiques of this approach is the idea that it is offensive to insure 
against racial change.321 But a broad-based realigning of homeownership risk 
could also protect homeowners against many potential sources of home value 
change unrelated to neighborhood composition.322 While I will not repeat here 
the arguments in favor of and against a reduced-risk version of 
homeownership, it should be noted that this represents one possible way of 
beginning to address the search gap—and one that would do so without 
limiting homeseeker choice. Here too, tax policy could play a primary role in 
encouraging more integration-friendly forms of tenure. 
Explicit subsidies to encourage integrative moves represent another set of 
approaches; they lower the stakes by simply reducing the entry price. One 
version of this idea, a low-interest mortgage available only to households for 
whom a move will be pro-integrative, has been the subject of some past 
experimentation and analysis.323 The approach, as usually conceived, takes 
 
319 Of course, regulatory attention would be necessary to ensure that such alternatives did 
not feature predatory or unconscionable terms, as the recent resurgence of problematic 
“contract for deed” arrangements demonstrates. See Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra 
Stevenson, ‘Contract for Deed’ Lending Gets Federal Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(May 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/business/dealbook/contract-for-deed-
lending-gets-federal-scrutiny.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/SF4Q-TEMN].  
320 See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 163, 172-73; William A. Fischel, An Economic 
History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 335 (2004); 
Matityahu Marcus & Michael K. Taussig, A Proposal for Government Insurance of Home 
Values Against Locational Risks, 46 LAND ECON. 404, 408-12 (1970); Maureen A. 
McNamara, The Legality and Efficacy of Homeowner’s Equity Assurance: A Study of Oak 
Park, Illinois, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1468-69 (1984); Adam Yarmolinsky, Reassuring the 
Small Homeowner, 22 PUB. INT. 106, 106 (1971). 
321 See ELLEN, supra note 6, at 173. 
322 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 
(2008) (discussing such a broad-based approach as well as other past and proposed risk-
reduction models). 
323 See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 168-69 (discussing several such programs and citing 
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explicit account of race: although the program is open to homebuyers of all 
races, whether a particular buyer will receive a subsidized mortgage for a 
particular home will depend on the race of that buyer and the racial 
composition of the neighborhood in which the home is located.324 Despite one 
favorable Attorney General opinion,325 such a race-conscious approach could 
raise constitutional and statutory red flags.326 
 
related literature); Suja A. Thomas, Efforts to Integrate Housing: The Legality of Mortgage-
Incentive Programs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 940 (1991) (describing pro-integration mortgage 
programs adopted in Ohio and Wisconsin and analyzing the legality of such programs); The 
Value of Integration, NAT’L HOUS. INST. (Mar./Apr. 2001), 
http://www.shelterforce.com/online/issues/116/PRISM.html [https://perma.cc/R8V9-EZQX] 
(describing the South Orange/Maplewood [New Jersey] Community Coalition on Race’s 
Pro-Integrative Supplemental Money (PRISM) program, which offers below market loans to 
homebuyers entering “an area where they are racially under-represented”); see also W. 
DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RACIAL DILEMMA 202-10 (1994) (discussing pro-
integrative mortgage incentive programs and the results of a study evaluating four of the 
programs in Cuyahoga County); Mittie Olion Chandler, Obstacles to Housing Integration 
Program Efforts, in THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK & WHITE 286, 292-97 (George C. Galster & 
Edward W. Hill eds., 1992) (providing a case study of Ohio’s program and describing other 
similar efforts); HOWARD HUSOCK, “INTEGRATION INCENTIVES” IN SUBURBAN CLEVELAND 
(Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Case No. C16-89-877.0, 1989), 
http://case.hks.harvard.edu/integration-incentives-in-suburban-cleveland/ 
[https://perma.cc/RL2S-RY3E] (providing a detailed case study of Ohio’s program in 
suburban Cleveland); Brian A. Cromwell, Prointegrative Subsidies and Their Effect on 
Housing Markets: Do Race-Based Loans Work? (Cleveland Fed. Reserve Bank, Working 
Paper No. 9018, 1990), https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-
events/publications/working-papers/working-papers-archives/1990-working-papers/wp-
9018-prointegrative-subsidies-and-their-effect-on-housing-markets-do-race-based-loans-
work.aspx [https://perma.cc/6K94-QL4J] (analyzing the impact of Ohio’s mortgage 
program in Shaker Heights).  
324 See Thomas, supra note 323, at 950. Defining what counts as pro-integrative is a 
primary design challenge. Programs must select benchmarks such as the overall composition 
of a city or metropolitan area, and then determine how far from those benchmarks 
qualifying communities must be in order for households moving into them to collect 
subsidies for making progress toward those benchmarks. See id. at 944-52 (describing the 
program details of the Ohio Housing Finance Agency’s pro-integration mortgage assistance 
program and Wisconsin’s Alternative Financing for Opening Residential Doors (AFFORD) 
program, and assessing a hypothetical mortgage subsidy program). 
325 Ohio Attorney General Anthony J. Celebreeze, Jr. issued an opinion in 1987 
concluding that the Ohio Housing Finance Agency’s (OHFA) pro-integration loan program 
was a legally acceptable temporary measure to advance the legitimate state goal of 
integration. Op. Ohio Att’y Gen. 87-095 (1987) (finding OHFA’s pro-integration mortgage 
program did not violate antidiscrimination law or the equal protection clause in the United 
States or Ohio constitutions). Celebreeze reached his conclusion on the constitutional issue 
by applying rational basis review, based on his view that the loan program did not classify 
based on race, but rather only on one’s attitude toward integration. Id. at 629-30. But see 
Thomas, supra note 323, at 964-65 (suggesting Celebreeze improperly applied rational basis 
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One alternative might be to define qualifying moves based not on the 
buyer’s race, but rather her previous residence: a buyer could qualify for a low-
cost mortgage if a race that was significantly underrepresented in her old 
neighborhood has significantly greater representation in her new 
neighborhood.327 A program using these criteria would serve the race-neutral 
goal of shaking up established search patterns and encouraging people of all 
races to experiment with living in neighborhoods that are significantly 
different from the ones to which they have become accustomed.328 Such an 
approach might be coupled with additional community-level subsidies, granted 
(or withheld) annually, to residents in neighborhoods that achieve and maintain 
a certain level of integration.329 Giving everyone in the community a stake in 
integration could assist other affirmative marketing and informational 
 
review). 
326 Analysis of these legal issues is beyond the scope of this Article, but would likely 
focus on whether the pro-integration goal and availability to all would be sufficient to 
overcome the race-consciousness baked into the program. Thomas, supra note 323, is the 
most extensive legal analysis of the issue of which I am aware. While she concludes that a 
well-designed program could survive statutory and constitutional challenges, see id. at 961-
78, her analysis hinges on a court’s willingness to apply intermediate scrutiny to the 
program, as well as on a certain degree of openness to race-based remedies. Thomas’s 
analysis, like all of the other research that I could locate on integrative mortgage subsidies, 
is now decades old and cannot account for more recent legal developments involving race-
based remedies. 
327 Definitional questions abound (e.g., how much underrepresentation is required in the 
old neighborhood, and how much greater must the representation be in the new 
neighborhood?). But these questions should be no more difficult to address in this context 
than under programs that explicitly rely on the race of the purchaser. To prevent gaming, 
homebuyers might be required to identify a past residence at which they had lived, say, two 
of the last five years, with multiple past residences aggregated in some fashion if necessary. 
To avoid cascades producing resegregation, the receiving neighborhood’s composition 
could be assessed in a manner that would take account of other people currently in the 
process of purchasing homes there, and neighborhoods could be removed from the program 
once certain integration targets were reached or if turnover rates exceeded particular levels. 
328 Given entrenched segregation, certain racial groups would qualify at greater rates for 
subsidized loans to move into particular neighborhoods (while other racial groups would 
qualify at greater rates for moves to different neighborhoods). But this effect would likely 
survive a disparate impact challenge given its capacity to advance the important 
governmental purpose of integration. Disparate impact analysis should, however, inform 
and shape the program details to ensure that low-cost loans are not, in the aggregate, 
disproportionately flowing to one racial group rather than another. This has been a concern 
with past pro-integrative mortgage programs. See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 323, at 294 
(noting opposition to the Ohio program from a number of organizations alleging that choice 
was being limited for black buyers while benefits flowed primarily to white buyers).  
329 Combining strategies could avoid any perceived unfairness associated with granting 
subsidies to people coming from initially segregated environments, and also remove 
perverse incentives to alter one’s neighborhood environment to qualify residents for 
mortgage subsidies for future moves.  
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strategies by encouraging a wider dispersal of information about available 
units. 
Some of the highest stakes for homeseekers may be nonfinancial in nature. 
White families with children appear more sensitive to neighborhood racial 
composition than those without children.330 To the extent this pattern is driven 
by concerns about schools, in-kind subsidies to those locating in integrated 
neighborhoods might take the form of priority in school choice plans.331 More 
broadly, finding ways to encourage temporary entry into unfamiliar 
communities could spur valuable learning. Here, it is interesting to consider the 
ways in which new business models like Airbnb have enabled people to gain 
familiarity with neighborhoods in a low-stakes way.332 Well-designed 
adaptations could enable families to gain first-hand familiarity with different 
areas within a city. 
Of course, any of these approaches would introduce difficult design issues. 
My point here is not to advocate for any particular policy but rather to suggest 
the need for, and potential traction of, creative thinking around the issue of 
housing search. 
CONCLUSION 
Our fair housing laws express a normative commitment: that race will not 
influence one’s housing opportunities, and that one’s life chances will not be 
 
330 See, e.g., ELLEN supra note 6, at 127-28, 142, 154; Emerson, Chai & Yancey, supra 
note 69, at 930. 
331 For an interesting proposal along these lines, see A. Mechele Dickerson, Caught in 
the Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1273 (2005) (reviewing 
ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP (2003)). 
332 See, e.g., David Roberts, Our Year of Living Airbnb, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/realestate/our-year-of-living-airbnb.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/D8A9-WGEP] (chronicling a year of living for one-month stretches in a 
series of Airbnb rentals throughout New York in an effort to gain more familiarity with 
various neighborhoods); see also Lee Chilcote, How One Couple Turned a “Toxic Corner” 
of Cleveland into a Development Hotbed, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2015/09/hingetown-neighborhood-cleveland 
[https://perma.cc/B8GU-GRHL] (describing a couple’s redevelopment efforts in an area of 
Cleveland they dubbed “Hingetown,” “including a full-time Airbnb unit they use to show 
off the neighborhood”). Perhaps recognizing this potential, Airbnb launched a “live like a 
local” partnership with Realtor.com in 2015 to enable people to live in neighborhoods they 
were considering purchasing in. See NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, Airbnb, Realtor.com Team 
Up, DAILY REAL ESTATE NEWS (June 23, 2015) http://realtormag.realtor.org/daily-
news/2015/06/24/airbnb-realtorcom-team-up [https://perma.cc/TC7G-Q4MF]. Although it is 
unclear if this feature is still in operation or what its level of success may have been, a more 
recent initiative, Realstir, offers a platform through which homesellers can make their 
properties available to potential buyers on a trial basis. Want to Learn More About Try 
Before You Buy?, REALSTIR, https://www.realstir.com/tbyb-center.php 
[https://perma.cc/7PXN-2NGN] (last visited Dec. 5, 2016).  
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arbitrarily limited by residential racial segregation. Recent events have shown 
a renewed willingness to deliver on that promise. In Inclusive Communities, 
the Supreme Court not only recognized a disparate impact cause of action in 
the FHA, but also reaffirmed that integration remains a continuing goal of the 
Act.333 With a new final rule, HUD has taken concerted action to pour 
meaningful content into the FHA’s affirmatively further mandate.334 The time 
is ripe to consider what the future of fair housing should look like. That future, 
I suggest, should include more careful attention to housing search. 
Homeseeking bias currently interposes a gap between the rights that fair 
housing law aspires to extend to all households and the liability that it 
generates for actors who interfere with those rights. Because biased search 
represents a form of intentional discrimination that can powerfully entrench 
segregation, leaving it unaddressed requires some justification. Ignoring search 
means shifting costs somewhere else—either to those who lose out as a result 
of these cumulative search patterns, or to some other actors that the law will 
hold to account. 
This Article presents a two-pronged approach to the search gap. First, we 
should not accept at face value the conventional view that the conduct of 
homeseekers is untouchable. While there are good normative reasons to avoid 
intruding into the ultimate decisions that homeseekers make, this does not 
mean that all facets of homeseeking should be exempted from scrutiny. 
Second, to the extent that we cannot or will not reach discriminatory 
homeseeking, the gap that it produces requires something more of other actors 
than the bare duty not to intentionally discriminate. Both the disparate impact 
cause of action and the affirmatively further mandate provide legal hooks for 
shifting the costs associated with biased search onto parties who are in a 
position to bear or mitigate those costs. 
Discriminatory search is, of course, only one source of the overall gap 
between expressed rights and enforced duties in the fair housing domain. This 
Article’s deep conceptual and doctrinal dive into search has necessarily left 
unaddressed many other contributors to segregation and, more broadly, to 
social inequities associated with residential patterns.335 The analysis here thus 
addresses only one piece of a large and difficult puzzle—but it is an important 
piece, and one that should no longer be neglected. Allowing the costs of biased 
 
333 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2525-26 (2015).  
334 Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015) (to be 
codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576 & 903). 
335 See generally Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of 
Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to 
Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 855 (2016); Tama Leventhal, Véronique 
Dupéré & Elizabeth A. Shuey, Children in Neighborhoods, in 4 HANDBOOK OF CHILD 
PSYCHOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 493 (Marc H. Bornstein & Tama Leventhal 
eds., 7th ed. 2015) (reviewing the literature on links between children’s neighborhood 
environments and life outcomes).  
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homeseeking to fall unabated on minority households and communities is not 
consistent with the promise of fair housing. We must search for better 
alternatives. 
 
